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VARIETIES OF POLICE POLICY: A STUDY OF POLICE
POLICY REGARDING THE USE OF DEADLY
FORCE IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY
by Gerald F. Ueimen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate as to the most effective method of controlling the be-
havior of police is by no means closed. In the decade since the United
States Supreme Court opted in favor of evidentiary exclusionary rules,
as the best means of "policing the police," dissatisfaction with
this alternative has steadily mounted.2 New attention is now being
focused upon civil tort liability as a more effective alternative. 3 This
preoccupation with external methods of control has virtually ignored
the growing sense of responsibility on the part of many law enforce-
ment agencies themselves to set standards of conduct for their officers
and to enforce these standards through internal disciplinary proceed-
ings. The question of how police policy is formulated and promul-
* Acting Professor of Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles. This research was
sponsored by the Institute on Law and Urban Studies of Loyola University School of
Law, Los Angeles, California, under a grant from U.S. Public Health Service, PHS
Grant No. 7 RO1 MH20054-01-02 from the Center for Studies of Metropolitan
Problems, National Institute of Mental Health. Substantial assistance in the statistical
tabulations for this study was rendered by Ms. Brenda Irons, '73, and in the editorial
research, by Ms. Nancy Menzies, '74. The author bears sole responsibility for the
opinions and findings expressed in this report.
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282
P.2d 905 (1955); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct By Police, 52 J.
CRim. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
2. See, e.g., LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Mak-
ing and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 987, 1000-12 (1965);
McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Il Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 266 (1961); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970).
3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (creating a private civil cause of action for damages against federal offi-
cials who violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and re-
manding for a determination as to whether federal agents are immune from liability
by virtue of their official position), considered on remand, 456 F.2d 1339 (2nd Cir.
1972) (determining that while federal agents have no immunity from damage suits
charging violation of constitutional rights, it is a valid defense to such charges to prove
that the federal officer acted in good faith in carrying out the search); Berch, Money
Damages for Fourth Amendment Violations by Federal Officials: An Explanation of
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gated has received little attention from legal scholars.4 The effective-
ness of internal sanctions as a means of controlling police conduct is
also largely unscrutinized. 5 Finally, the current emphasis upon tort
liability as a means of control presents the nagging but virtually unad-
dressed question of how the prospect of civil liability affects the de-
termination and enforcement of internal police policy.
Police policy regarding the use of deadly force presents an excellent
setting in which to study these questions. Very broad statutory provi-
sions as to the use of deadly force by police officers" create a keenly
felt need for more specific guidelines on an administrative level. The
onslaught of large-scale rioting and civil disorder in our largest cities
in recent years has provided additional incentive for the promulgation
of specific guidelines. Today, since most large metropolitan police de-
partments have adopted administrative policies specifying when deadly
force may be used by their officers,7 a good deal of comparative data
is available. It is therefore possible to trace the formulation of policy
by a number of different departments during a relatively compact pe-
riod of time. Moreover, in the administrative reporting structure of most
police departments, every discharge of a fireai'm by an officer will nor-
mally be brought to the attention of his superiors. Thus, a storehouse of
relevant statistical data as to how these incidents are investigated, ad-
judicated and disposed of should be available. Finally, the effect of
prospective tortliability upon police policy presents itself most force-
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1971 LAW &
Soc. ORDER 43 (1971); du Fresne, "Non-Visible Scar" Police Misconduct As a § 1983
Deprivation of Civil Rights, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 372 (1971); Note, The Constitution As
Positive Law: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 5 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 126 (1972). See also Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MnqN. L. R-v. 493 (1955).
4. Igleburger & Schubert, Policy Making for the Police, 58 A.B.A.J. 307 (1972).
But see K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 80-96 (1969); Goldstein, Police Policy
Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MncH. L. REv. 1123
(1967).
5. Notable exceptions include J. WILSON, VAIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968);
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
URBAN POuCE FUNCTION (Tentative Draft, March 1972) [hereinafter cited as ThE
URBAN POLICE FUNCTION]; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JuSTcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
6 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 196, 835a (West 1972). See text accompanying note 13
infra.
7. In a 1964 survey of cities with populations in excess of 250,000, 42 of the 45
cities responding indicated they had departmental rules, regulations or procedures gov-
erning the use of firearms by their officers. Cincinnati Police Division, Police Regu-
lations Governing Use of Firearms Survey, April 22, 1964.
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fully in the setting of policy regarding the use of deadly force, because
incidents involving the use of deadly force by police officers are more
likely to culminate in civil litigation than any other single aspect of police
conduct.'
This study will explore these questions in the context of the formu-
lation, promulgation, and enforcement of police policy regarding the
use of deadly force in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. A total of
fifty different independent police agencies operate within the confines
of Los Angeles County. Thus, a broad basis of comparison is availa-
ble among police departments operating in a single urban milieu. The
data used for these comparisons was collected from four basic sources.
First, the Chief of Police or another administrative official in each of
these fifty departments was personally interviewed in depth9 as to how
his department's policy was formulated and how it would be interpreted
and enforced in the context of five hypothetical situations. Second,
copies of their written policies were obtained from nearly all of these
departments. 10 Third, statistical data reflecting the characterization
and disposition of all firearm discharges by officers for a two-year pe-
riod was supplied by forty of the fifty departments." Finally,
selected departments permitted the same series of five hypo-
thetical questions to be posed to each of their officers in order to test
8. The experience in the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, which handles all
civil claims for compensation arising from conduct of Los Angeles Police Depart-
ent officers, has been that, while less than half of all claims result in litigation, most
claims involving the use of firearms by police officers are ultimately litigated.
While the number of administrative claims, as well as the number of lawsuits, arising
from activity of the Los Angeles Police Department has risen substantially in recent
years, the proportion of lawsuits to administrative claims has remained relatively con-
stant:
Claims Lawsuits
1963 90 27
1964 120 54
1965 172 65
1966 167 82
1967 246 95
1968 281 137
1969 368 149
1970 490 191
1971 380 177
Claims involving the use of deadly force are a small portion of these claims: .20 out
of the 380 claims filed in 1971, and 28 out of the 490 claims filed in 1970 involved the
use of firearms by the police officers. Interview with Sgt. Billy E. Stephens, Police
Statistician, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, August 8, 1972.
9. The individuals interviewed are listed by Department in the Appendix infra.
10. Only five departments with written policies declined to furnish copies. See-text
accompanying notes 75-83 infra.
11. See notes 101-02 and accompanying text infra.
1973]
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both the officers' familiarity with departmental policy and their reac-
tion to typical stress situations. Needless to say, a study of this nature
required extensive cooperation from each of the police agencies que-
ried. It was a source of deep gratification to this author to have been
afforded a cordial reception and meaningful assistance in virtually every
police department approached. The motivation for this spirit of open co-
operation was unquestionably a genuine interest by police administra-
tors in comparative data and statistical analysis of the type contem-
plated by this study to assist them in the difficult process of policy
formulation and enforcement.
"I". THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLICE POLICY TO LAWS
REGULATING THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE
By the very nature of their function, police are clothed with a great
deal of discretion in their actions. The law merely lays down the bor-
ders of that discretion; legislation can never purport to provide the
answer to how a policeman should react to every situation he encoun-
ters. The function of "policy," then, is to provide additional guidelines
to achieve some sort of uniformity-to insure that when individual
police officers confront similar situations, they will handle them in a
similar manner. Thus viewed, police "policy" differs little from the
rules and regulations adopted by any administrative agency, a point
tellingly made by Administrative Law expert Kenneth Culp Davis:
Unfortunately, our traditional legal classifications----"administrative
law," "the administrative process," and "administrative agencies"--
have customarily excluded police and prosecutors. . . . The police
are among the most important policy-makers of our entire society.
And they make far more discretionary determinations in individual
cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close sec-
ond. 12
The need for guidelines within the legislative framework is especially
acute with respect to the use of deadly force by police officers. At
least in California, the law is extremely broad. California Penal Code
section 835a simply provides:
Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force
to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance .... 13
While this section does not directly authorize the use of deadly force,
such authorization can be found elsewhere in the Penal Code provi-
12. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSI'CE 222 (1969).
13. CA L. P9N. CQDg & 8 5 (West 1972).
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sions relating to justifiable homicide. As in the case of any other per-
son, a police officer can use deadly force to defend himself or another
against death or great bodily injury inflicted by another.14 Although
the Penal Code does not spell out the distinction, a peace officer may
have an even broader justification in defending another than would an
ordinary person. Any citizen may use deadly force against an actual
attempt to murder or do some great bodily injury to another, but
where his justification is based only upon a "reasonable belief" that
such an attempt is in progress, and such belief is mistaken, he will
only have a defense available if the person he is defending is his "wife
or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant."'15 In the case
of a peace officer, however, such a distinction is less tenable than in
the situation of the ordinary citizen. Since he is charged with the duty
of protecting the general public, justification should be found in any
situation where the officer has a reasonable belief that deadly force is
necessary to protect another from imminent death or serious bodily in-
jury.
16
A peace officer also shares with every person the right to use deadly
force to prevent the commission of a felony. However, since this
right is limited to the prevention of felonies which threaten serious
bodily harm, 8 the justification apparently extends only to those situa-
tions where self-defense or defense of others would already excuse the
homicide.
Once a felony has actually been committed, any person, including a
peace officer, can use deadly force to apprehend the felon.' 9 With re-
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 197(1) (West 1972).
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 197(3) (West 1972). See R. PERKINS, CRIMNAL LAW 989-
93 (2d ed. 1969); Note, Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 829, 834 (1968).
16. R. PEmRuNs, CRimiNAL LAW 989-93 (2d ed. 1969); Note, Kill or Be Killed?:
Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 829, 834 (1968).
17. CAL. PEN. CODE § 197(1) (West 1972).
18. People v. Jones, 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1961). The Model
Penal Code would likewise only permit the use of deadly force to prevent felonies when
the threatened felony is dangerous or necessarily involves the use of force. MODEL.
PENAL CODE § 3.07, Comment 57 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
19. CAL. PEN. CODE § 197(4) (West 1972).
Under the California alternative sentencing structure, some offenses may be misde-
meanors or felonies, depending upon what sentence is ultimately imposed. California
Penal Code section 17(b) indicates the circumstances under which a "felony/misde-
meanor" will result in a misdemeanor sentence. California case law interpreting this
section has consistently held that:
[Ihf an offense is punishable either as a felony (by imprisonment in the state
prison) or as a misdemeanor (by imprisonment in the county jail), it is deemed
a felony for all purposes up to the imposition of sentence. Barker v. California-
1973]
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spect to peace officers, however, a homicide is additionally justified
"when necessarily committed in arresting persons charged with felony,
and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest. ' 20  This pro-
vision has been construed liberally to allow peace officers to use deadly
force upon reasonable belief that a person is fleeing the commission of a
felony, even though in fact no felony was actually committed.2 1
The breadth of these statutory provisions indicates how much dis-
cretion is left to the individual police officer. Under the Penal Code,
it would be justifiable homicide if an officer shot and killed a fourteen
year old boy fleeing the scene of an auto theft.22  Similarly, one resist-
ing an arrest on a charge of marijuana possession could justifiably be
killed if no other means were available to prevent his escape.28 While
few, if any, police officers would resort to the use of deadly force in
such situations, a decision to use deadly force is an irrevocable one,
frequently made with little or no time for reflection. Thus, some ad-
ministrative guidelines, in the form of police "policy," are required to
assist the police officer. The bare skeleton of the Penal Code provi-
sions offers no guidance as to which felonies should be regarded as
sufficiently dangerous to justify resorting to deadly force to prevent
their commission or to capture the perpetrator. Nor do the statutes
suggest the use of non-deadly .force if the felon is a juvenile or is
known to be intoxicated or otherwise incapacitated. Such guidelines
must come from police administrators.
Despite the apparent importance of police "policy" in controlling the
Western States Life Ins. Co., 252 Cal. App. 2d 768, 722, 61 Cal. Rptr. 595, 599
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968), citing, inter alia, People v. Banks, 53
Cal. 2d 370, 381, 348 P.2d 102, 109-10, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 676-77 (1959).
Thus, "fleeing felons" in California would include persons suspected of committing
a crime punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor who flee from the scene of the
crime.
20. CA .. PEN. CODE § 196(3) (West 1972) (emphasis added).
21. People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894). The Jones decision (see
note 18 and accompanying text supra) allows deadly force only to prevent felonies
involving a threat of serious bodily injury. But in defining the privilege of using
deadly force to prevent a felon's escape, the law has not concerned itself with the na-
ture of the felony; the privilege exists even though the crime was not accompanied by a
threat of danger to the safety of any person. See Murphy v. Murray, 74 Cal. App.
726, 241 P. 938 (1925). Thus, California retains the common law anomaly of allowing
a broader privilege to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a felon than would be
allowed to prevent the commission of the felony in the first place. Comment, Justifi-
cation for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L. REv. 566, 577-80 (1961).
22. Grand theft of an automobile is a felony/misdemeanor. CAL. PEN. CoDn
§§ 487(3), 489 (West 1972).. See note 19 supra.
23. Marijuana possession in California is a felony/misdemeanor. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11530 (West Supp. 1972). See note 19 supra.
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discretion of individual officers, the law has been slow to recognize the
significance of this rule-making function. There is no provision in any
of the California codes delegating to police administrators any rule-
making powers. While this is not an insurmountable barrier to the
police administrator who wishes to promulgate a policy, 4 many ad-
ministrators surveyed expressed a reluctance to announce policies lim-
iting the discretion of their officers in the absence of statutory authori-
zation, especially since the policy could create civil liability for both the
city and the officer.25  Conceivably, an officer who was disciplined for
a violation of department policy in the discharge of a firearm could
justly complain if his action was sanctioned by the law of the state and
the legislature had not delegated the power to in any way limit that
sanction. Thus, in its Standards Relating to the Urban Police Func-
tion, the American Bar Association recommends that legislatures ac-
tively encourage or require police administrative rule-making by dele-
gating administrative rule-making responsibility by statute and requir-
ing compliance therewith. 6
HI. POLICY DISPARITY IN Los ANGELES COUNTY
The most remarkable discovery in surveying the policies with re-
spect to the use of deadly force adopted by the fifty law enforcement
agencies in Los Angeles County was the vast disparity in the guidelines
offered to police in different departments. While there was general
uniformity with respect to the less controversial provisions of the Penal
Code, such as self-defense and defense of others, 7 the policies adopted
with respect to fleeing felons were surprisingly diverse. In determining
which felonies should be considered dangerous--en-ough to justify the
use of deadly force, police administrators expressed a wide range of
judgment. Similarly, the attitudes toward the use of deadly force
against fleeing juveniles reflected a deep divergence of opinion.
In order to ascertain the various departmental policies with respect
to these key areas, a series of five hypotheticals was devised. In the
24. K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 220 (1969):
Lack of a statutory provision which separately grants a rule-making power is not a
justification for failure to issue rules. Whenever an officer has a discretionary
power to decide what to do in a particular case, he necessarily has power to an-
nounce how he will exercise that power.
Cf. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U.L. REv. 785, 813 (1970).
25. See text accompanying notes 59-68 infra.
26. THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, supra note 5, § 4.4(a).
27. Although not specifically covered by the Penal Code, the firing of warning shots
was also universally proscribed by the departments surveyed.
19731
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course of the interview with each police chief or administrator, he was
asked whether it would be within his department's policy if an officer
discharged his gun at a suspect in each of the following five situations:
(1) An officer is responding to a silent burglary alarm at a ware-
house at night. As he exits from his patrol car, he observes a
suspect climbing out of a side window. He identifies himself as
a police officer, and calls to the suspect to halt. The suspect
runs down an empty alley.
(2) Assume that in addition to the facts set forth in (1) above, the
officer has an opportunity to observe the facial features of the
suspect as he climbs out the window, and he appears to be ap-
proximately 16 years old.
(3) An officer is responding to a report of a robbery in progress at a
liquor store at night. As he approaches the store, he observes
the suspect through the front window, holding a gun on the pro-
prietor. As he watches, the suspect turns to leave the premises,
tucking the gun in his belt. As the suspect runs out the door, the
officer identifies himself as a police officer and calls to the sus-
pect to halt. The suspect turns and runs up the empty street.
(4) Assume that in addition to the facts set forth in (3) above, the
officer observes the facial features of the suspect as he leaves the
premises, and he appears to be approximately 16 years old.
(5) An officer is responding to a call of a disturbance at a residence
at night. Upon arriving, he is asked to eject a party crasher, who
appears to be an adult. As he is escorting the suspect outside,
the suspect hits the officer in the face with his fist, knocking him
to the ground, and begins running up the empty street. The offi-
cer calls to the suspect to halt, but he continues running.
Each of these five situations is within the justifiable homicide provi-
sions of the California Penal Code: in the first and second hypothetical
situations, the officer would have reasonable cause to believe the suspect
was fleeing after commission of burglary, a felony;28 in the third and
fourth hypothetical situations, the officer would have reasonable cause to
believe the suspect was fleeing after commission of an armed robbery,
also a felony;29 in the fifth hypothetical situation, the officer would have
reasonable cause to believe the suspect was fleeing after commission of
an assault on a police officer.3 0 Thus, a response of "no" to any of
28. CAL. PEN. CODE § 461 (West 1972).
29. CAL. PEN. CODE § 213 (West 1972).
30. Under Penal Code section 241, assault upon a peace officer may be treated as
either a misdemeanor or a felony since the punishment prescribed by that statute offers
sentencing alternatives of imprisonment in either county jail or state prison. See note
[Vol. 6
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the hypotheticals would indicate that the departmental policy limited
the use of deadly force more than is required under the Penal Code.
The responses are presented in Table I.
TABLE I
Alhambra P. D. No No
Arcadia P. D. No No
Azusa P. D. No No
Baldwin Park P. D. No No
Bell P. D. Yes No
Bell Gardens P. D. Yes No
Beverly Hills P. D. Yes No
Burbank P. D. Yes Yes
Calif. Highway Patrol Yes No
Claremont P. D. Yes Yes
Compton P. D. No No
Covina P. D. Yes Yes
Culver City P. D. No No
Downey P. D. No No
El Monte P. D. Yes Yes
El Segundo P. D. No No
Gardena P. D. Yes No
Glendale P. D. No No
Glendora P. D. No No
Hawthorne P. D. Yes Yes
Hermosa Beach P. D. No No
Huntington Park P. D. Yes No
Inglewood P. D. Yes No
Irwindale P. D. No No
La Verne P.D. No No
Long Beach P. D. No No
Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Office No No
Los Angeles P. D. No No
Lynwood P. D. Yes No
Manhattan Beach P. D. No No
Maywood P. D. No No
Monrovia P. D. No No
Montebello P. D. Yes No
Monterey Park P. D. No No
Palos Verdes Estates P. D. No No
Pasadena P. D. No No
Pomona P. D. No No
Redondo Beach P. D. No No
San Fernando P. D. No No
San Gabriel P. D. No No
San Marino P. D. No No
Santa Monica P. D. No No
Sierra Madre P. D. No No
Signal Hill P. D. Yes No
South Gate P. D. No No
South Pasadena P. D. No No
Torrance P. D. Yes Yes
Vernon P. D. No No
West Covina P. D. No No
Whittier P. D. Yes Yes
TOTAL YES: 17 7
TOTAL NO: 33 43
#3 #4 #5
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Yes No No
Yes No No
Yes No No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Yes Yes No
No No No
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes No
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Yes No No
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
No No No
No No No
Yes No No
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
No No No
Yes No No
No No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Yes No No
Yes No No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No
39 23 1
11 27 49
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The nearly unanimous negative response to the fifth hypothetical,
even among those departments which professed to have no policy in
any respect limiting the provisions of the Penal Code, can be readily
explained. Since the unwavering policy of the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office is to charge assaults upon police officers
which do not involve the use of deadly force as misdemeanor simple
assaults rather than as felony assaults upon a police officer, 81 the assault
described in the fifth hypothetical was universally regarded as a mis-
demeanor by the peace officers interviewed. This offers an interest-
ing commentary upon police perceptions: they distinguish between
felonies and misdemeanors not on the basis of the legal technicalities
of the Penal Code, but rather on the basis of the cold realities of the
complaint division of the District Attorney's Office.2
In analyzing the responses to the first four hypotheticals, five basic
categories of restrictiveness of policy can be perceived:
I. Those departments which do not restrict the breadth of the Penal
Code provisions, allowing deadly force to be used in all four situa-
tions.
II. Those departments which prohibit the use of deadly force against
fleeing juveniles, but would allow deadly force to be used against
adult fleeing felons in both the case of the fleeing burglary suspect
described in the first hypothetical and the fleeing armed robbery
suspect described in the third hypothetical.
IIM. Those departments which significantly limit the type of felony
from which a suspect must be fleeing before deadly force may be
used, permitting it in the armed robbery situation of the third and
fourth hypotheticals, while prohibiting it in the case of the fleeing
burglary suspect of the first and second hypotheticals83
19 supra. Further, it should be noted that assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace
officer is treated only as a felony. CAL. PEN. CODE § 245 (West 1972).
If, however, a person commits an assault upon a peace officer while resisting an ar-
rest that is found to be factually unlawful, he can only be charged with simple assault.
If the arrest was found to be lawful, the assault would be considered a felony. People v.
Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969).
31. See note 30 supra.
32. The sole affirmative reply, reflecting a legalistic interpretation, is perhaps at-
tributable to the effects of a legal education. Chief of Police Huchel of the Covina
Police Department is a 1972 graduate of Loyola Law School.
33. Also placed in this category were the Huntington Park and Lynwood depart-
ments, which indicated that their policy would not permit the use of deadly force in
the second hypothetical, but would permit it in the first, third and fourth hypothetical
situations. While neither of these departments differentiate between fleeing adults and
juveniles in their policies, they would apparently prohibit the use of deadly force
against at least some burglary suspects, including juveniles. No such distinction would
be applied in the case of robbery suspects, however.
[Vol. 6
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IV. Those departments which limit the type of felony from which a
suspect must be fleeing and prohibit the use of deadly force
against fleeing juveniles, allowing deadly force to be used only in
the case of the fleeing adult armed robbery suspect of the third
hypothetical.
V. Those departments which verge on a policy of straight self-defense
or defense of others, prohibiting the use of deadly force in all four
of these hypothetical fleeing felon situations.34
The categorization of departments according to this formula is set
forth in Table II, which also indicates the number of sworn police offi-
cers in the department, and the population of the area served by the
department.
TABLE II
Number of Population
Department Officers Served (000)
CATEGORY I:
(Penal Code Equivalent)
Burbank P. D. 137 89
Claremont P. D. 24 24
Covina P. D. 41 30
El Monte P. D. 83 70
Hawthorne P. D. 57 57
Torrance P. D. 188 138
Whittier P. D. 86 73
TOTALS 616 481
CATEGORY 11:
(Juvenile Restrictions)
Bell P. D. 26 23
Bell Gardens P. D. 42 30
Beverly Hills P. D. 93 35
Gardena P. D. 71 45
Inglewood P. D. 110 90
Montebello P. D. 56 43
Signal Hill P. D. 23 6
Calif. Highway Patrol 1,196 -
TOTALS 1,617 272
CATEGORY 111.
(Felony Restrictions)
Arcadia P.D. 68 50
Azusa P.D. 47 28
Culver City P. D. 58 37
Glendora P. D. 41 32
34. The policy followed by these departments approximates that followed by most
federal law enforcement agencies, which were not included in this survey. The policy of
both the F.B.I. and the Treasury Department agencies, such as the Secret Service, is to
discharge a firearm only when the life of the officer or of another person is in danger.
I WonKINo PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM oF FEDERAL CRImINAL
LAws 268-69 (1970).
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Huntington Park P. D. 52 31
Los Angeles P. D. 7,000 3,000
Lynwood P. D. 52 45
Maywood P. D. 21 18
Monrovia P. D. 51 30
Monterey Park P. D. 63 50
Pomona P. D. 121 89
Redondo Beach P. D. 67 59
Santa Monica P. D. 136 87
Sierra Madre P. D. 17 12
Vernon P. D. 63 0
West Covina P. D. 77 70
TOTALS 7,934 3,638
CATEGORY IV:
(Both Felony andJuvenile Restrictions) Baldwin Park P. D. 55 49
El Segundo P. D. 58 16
Hermosa Beach P. D. 31 20
Long Beach P. D. 663 370
Palos Verdes Estates P. D. 21 15
San Gabriel P. D. 49 30
South Gate P. D. 88 57
South Pasadena P. D. 34 24
TOTALS 999 581
CATEGORY V:
(Self-Defense or
Grave Threat)
Alhambra P. D. 87 65
Compton P. D. 147 78
Downey P. D. 100 90
Glendale P. D. 160 132
Irwindale P. D. 15 1
La Verne P. D. 17 15
L. A. County Sheriff 5,000 1,744
Manhattan Beach P. D. 52 36
Pasadena P. D. 194 113
San Marino P. D. 30 15
San Fernando P. D. 33 18
TOTALS 5,833 2,307
In thus categorizing the restrictiveness of the policies of the fifty
police departments operating in Los Angeles County, no apparent pat-
tern emerges. The size of the department is not determinative, since
the six largest police departments in the county appear in all five
categories. The character of the community appears to be irrelevant;
in each category can be found communities of every description,
whether characterized by wealthy, middle class or working class popu-
lation, and whether commercial, industrial or suburban areas. One
familiar with the political geography of Los Angeles County will im-
mediately recognize that no significant geographical pattern emerges
either. Three-fourths of Los Angeles County's 4,000 square miles is
unincorporated, thus covered by the policy of the County Sheriff's de-
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partment. One-fifth of the incorporated area is also covered by the
Sheriff's policy, since twenty-nine cities contract with the Sheriff for
police services, rather than maintain their own police departments.3 5
The fact that most of these "contract cities" are in the eastern half of
the county accounts for the dominance of category five in that area.
Each of the largest concentrations of racial minorities appear to be in
areas governed by similar categories of policy. Most of the south-
eastern portion of the county, with a large Chicano population, is cov-
ered by departments whose policy is most restrictive, Category V.
The South-Central area of Los Angeles, the heaviest concentration of
Black population, is, of course, covered by the Los Angeles Police
Department's policy. Contiguous areas with independent departments
have adopted a variety of policies, however, in each of the five cate-
gories.
Nor does a readily discernible pattern present itself when the arrest
rate in the areas served by each department is analyzed. In Table
Ill, the cities in Los Angeles County3 6 are listed in descending order
of their arrest rate, based upon the seven major offenses as reported
for 1970.11
TABLE HI
Arrests for Rate Per
Major Crimes 1,000
City (1970) Population Category
Compton 8,816 113.0 V
Signal Hill 335 55.8 11
Pasadena 5,667 50.1 V
Huntington Park 1,546 49.9 111
Los Angeles 146,181 48.7 11
San Fernando 831 46.2 V
Santa Monica 3,793 43.6 I1
Inglewood 3,894 43.3 II
Lynwood 1,933 42.9 I1
Culver City 1,370 37.1 11
35. The contract cities are: Artesia, Avalon, Bellflower, Bradbury, Carson, Com-
merce, Cudahy, Cerritos, Duarte, Hawaiian Gardens, Hidden Hills, Industry, Lakewood,
La Miranda, La Puente, Lawndale, Lomita, Norwalk, Palmdale, Paramount, Pico Rivera,
Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills Estates, Rosemead, San Dimas, Santa Fe Springs, South
El Monte, Temple City and Walnut.
36. The cities of Irwindale and Vernon are not included in this tabulation, since
meaningful crime rates based upon population cannot be computed. Both are heavy
industrial areas, with large day-time populations of factory workers, but permanent
populations of less than five hundred.
37. CAL. Bua Au oF CRiiNAL STATISTICS, DEP'T oF JUSTIcE, CRmms Aim ARRsETS,
Table I, at 11-12 (1970). The seven offenses used are willful homicide, robbery, ag-
gravated assault, forcible rape, burglary, auto theft, and other thefts over $200.
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South Gate 2,048 35.9 IV
Long Beach 13,184 35.6 IV
Beverly Hills 1,204 34.4 II
Redondo Beach 1,951 33.1 111
Pomona 2,904 32.6 m
Los Angeles County
(Incl. Contract Cities) 56,717 32.5 V
Gardena 1,399 31.1 I1
Montebello 1,301 30.2 17
El Segundo 448 28.0 IV
El Monte 1,938 27.7 I
Hawthorne 1,565 27.4 I
Manhattan Beach 978 27.2 V
Bell 597 25.9 II
Torrance 3,530 25.6 I
Monrovia 766 25.5 I
Azusa 707 25.2 II1
Covina 757 25.2 I
Hermosa Beach 505 25.2 IV
Downey 2,218 24.8 V
Alhambra 1,583 24.3 V
Glendale 3,059 23.1 V
Baldwin Park 1,094 22.3 IV
Burbank 1,961 22.0 I
West Covina 1,497 21.4 i1
South Pasadena 514 21.4 IV
Bell Gardens 634 21.1 17
Whittier 1,514 20.7 I
Maywood 367 20.4 i11
San Gabriel 544 18.1 IV
Glendora 546 17.1 ill
Claremont 387 16.1 I
Monterey Park 733 14.7 ill
La Verne 213 14.2 V
Arcadia 707 14.1 I1
Palos Verdes Estates 208 13.9 IV
Sierra Madre 126 10.5 ill
San Marino 129 8.G V
As can be seen, cities with the highest arrest rates are just as likely to
have the most restrictive policy on the use of deadly force as are cities
with the lowest arrest rates. Among the nine cities with the highest arrest
rates, over 40 major crimes reported per 1,000 population, two fall into
Category 11, four are in Category II, and three in Category V. Among
the nine areas with arrest rates between 30 and 40 major crimes per
1,000 population, three are in Category H, three in Category 11, two in
Category IV, and one in Category V. Among the twenty cities with
arrest rates between 20 and 30 major crimes per 1,000 population, we
find six of the seven cities which fall into Category I. Two cities are in
Category II, while four each are in Categories III, IV and V. Finally, of
the nine cities with the lowest arrest rates, less than 20 crimes per 1,000
population, one is in Category I, four in Category III, and two each in
Categories IV and V.
A slight pattern may appear, however, in computing a collective arrest
rate for all of the cities in each of the five categories. Collectively, the
seven cities in Category I have an arrest rate of 24.2 major crimes per
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1,000 population. In Category 11, the collective rate is 34.4 for the
seven cities included. For the fifteen cities in Category HI, the rate is
45.5, but when the top-heavy crime rate for the City of Los Angeles is
omitted from the calculation, the collective rate for the remaining cities
is 30.6. Category IV reflects a collective rate of 31.9 for its eight
cities. Category V shows a collective rate of 34.8 when the sprawling
statistics of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office are included, but
an even higher rate of 41.9 when only the other nine cities in this cate-
gory are computed. Thus, a slight tendency appears for cities with
higher arrest rates to have more restrictive police policies on the use of
deadly force. This kind of computation can be suspected, however,
in view of the wide disparity _among-the arrest rates of the cities in
each category. For example, Category V includes both Compton,
with the highest arrest rate in Los Angeles County, 113 major crimes
per 1,000 population, and San Marino, with the lowest arrest rate in
the County, 8.6 major crimes per 1,000 population.
The absence of a meaningful pattern showing some relationship be-'
tween the character of the community and the policy adopted by its
police department as to the use of deadly force raises serious questions
as to the formulation of police policy. It would appear that variations
in policy are not reflections of different conditions under which the
various police departments operate. Nor do the variations appear to
be the result of varying community sentiments as to the vigor with
which law enforcement officers should pursue fleeing felons. An in-
quiry as to how police policy is formulated discloses that the major
factor which accounts for this wide disparity in policy is the equally
wide diversity in the personal philosophies of the fifty chiefs of police
who administer the various police departments in Los Angeles County.,
IV. THE FORMuLATION OF POLICY
Realistic formulation of police policy requires input from a wide
variety of sources. The expertise of police administrators must be sup-
plemented with the experience of police officers at every level, the cau-
tion of an attorney's advice as to legal implications, the sensitivity of
elected officials, the reactions of other components in the criminal jus-
tice system, and some means of citizen participation. In addition, the
policies of neighboring police departments should be considered. If
police policy is perceived as being nothing more than the dictates of
individual police administrators, the public confidence so vital to the
successful operation of police agencies will be undermined. The neces-
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sity for input from other sources has been recently recognized in a num-
ber of recommendatons by the Advisory Committee on the Police Func-
tion of the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice,18 as well as the Task Force on the Police of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. 80
In recommending that police administrators develop methods to en-
sure effective participation in the policy-making process by all ranks
including the patrolman, the A.B.A. Committee observed:
The need for participation is not limited to supervisory personnel be-
cause the patrolman, possibly more than anyone, is uniquely aware of
operational problems and needs and has unique expertise. The failure
by police administrators to provide opportunity for their personnel to
participate in the policy-making process will inevitably result in efforts
to use other, less desirable means of achieving such participation.
40
The advice of an attorney is of vital concern to the police adminis-
trator in view of the increasing complexity of legislation and court de-
cisions regulating police conduct. In noting the need for in-house
police legal advisors, the A.B.A. Committee recommended that, among
the range of tasks to be performed by such advisors, first priority should
be given to assisting police administrators in formulating administrative
policies.
4 1
While the input of elected officials may be a mixed blessing, and
many cities pride themselves on the insulation of their police depart-
ments from the political influences of mayors or city councilmen, such
input may be of significant assistance in formulating realistic policy
which will have public support. As long as this input is a public one,
concern over improper influence can be allayed. This was the con-
clusion of the Task Force on the Police:
It may be helpful, in the long-range interest of law enforcement, to
involve local officials in the process of developing enforcement policies,
particularly those which have an impact upon a broad segment of the
community. . . . Although this involvement of city government may
give rise to concern over "political influence," the risk of improper in-
fluence is minimized by the fact that the involvement is open to view.
The vice of political influence of an earlier day was that it tended to be
38. THE URBAN POLICE FuNCrON, supra note 5, §§ 4.4, 4.5.
39. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 25-27.
40. THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION, supra note 5, § 6.2, commentary at 174; cf.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.
41. THE URBAN POLICE FUNCmTON, supra note 5, § 7.14, at 244. See generally Cap-
lan, The Police Legal Advisor, 58 J. CimM. L.C. & P.S. 303 (1967); Jorgenson &
Levine, The Police Legal Advisor, 45 FLA. B.J. 66 (1971).
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of a personal nature and was secretive.42
The other components in the criminal justice system which are most
affected by the policies formulated by the police are, of course, the
prosecutor, who may have to litigate the propriety of the police offi-
cer's conduct in a criminal case, and the courts, whose decisions may
render police policy a legal nullity. Unquestionably, the prosecutor
can no longer conceive of his role "as limited to the trial and appeal of
criminal cases rather than the development of enforcement policies
which anticipate many of the issues before they arise in a litigated
case." 43  With respect to the courts, the question is a more difficult
one. The judiciary is understandably reluctant to compromise its neu-
trality by involving itself in the formulation of policies upon which it
may have to pass judgment. Yet, a frequent criticism of the failure
of exclusionary rules as a means of controlling police conduct is the
failure of the judiciary to "follow through" beyond merely consigning
opinions in individual cases to the official reports.44  The esteem
which most police officers still have for the courts places the judiciary
in a unique position to affect the formulation of policy. Recognizing
this, the A.B.A. Committee has recommended that the courts actively
encourage police administrative rule-making.
45
In rare instances, courts have gone beyond mere encouragement to
affirmatively order police departments to develop and adopt instruc-
tions for their officers and plans for disciplinary action to be taken
against officers who fail to comply with these instructions.46 More
recently, Judge Carl McGowan of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit noted the numerous advantages
of judicial review of police policy prior to its implementation:
There is, first, the desirability, in these times of congested dockets, of
reducing the number of individual criminal appeals as much as possible.
42. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 33.
43. Id.
44. THE URBAN POLICE FUNcTioN, supra note 5, § 4.4, commentary at 134; Mc-
Gowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 673 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as McGowan]. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987,
1005 (1965); H. Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of
Police Authority, 58 J. CumM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 169 (1967) [hereinafter cited as H.
Goldstein].
45. TrE URAN POLICE FUNCTION, supra note 5, § 4.4(b).
46. Hicks v. Knight, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1504, 1507-08 (E.D. La. 1965); cf.
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Amsterdam, The Su-
preme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 785, 810
(1970); McGowan, supra note 44, at 684-85.
19731
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
If a police practice embodied in a general rule withstands scrutiny by
the courts promptly after issuance, defense attorneys will have no basis
for filing repeated criminal appeals incorporating the same challenge.
A second advantage is that pre-implementation review would enable the
courts to examine a broader range of police practices. This includes
those which do not normally produce evidence and which do not, there-
fore, come to light in a criminal trial. These very practices may, how-
ever, have substantial impact upon rights of privacy and the inherent
dignity of the individual.
A third consideration emerges from what has been described as a
weakness of the present system of judicial review, namely, that it repre-
sents "a decision about the propriety of the actions of the individual
officer rather than a review of departmental administrative policy."
Pre-implementation review would shift the focus from individual dere-
lictions to department-wide policies; and surely it is the latter which is the
more vital concern of the courts. It is also true that a first essential of
adequate administration of discipline within the police department is the
early establishment of the illegality of the conduct sought to be punished.
If there are clear definitions of proper police conduct which have success-
fully survived challenge in the courts, the police administrator is im-
measurably strengthened in his capacity to secure adherence to those
definitions by the prospect of departmental discipline.
J Lastly, improper police activity is, even apart from conviction of
crime, frequently irreparable in a literal sense. It entails limitations
upon freedom of movement and invasions of privacy for which there
are virtually no means of redress. Thus it is important that rules lia-
ble to such defects be examined as quickly as possible and their imple-
mentation prevented. Pre-implementation review would serve this in-
terest to a degree necessarily wanting in piecemeal challenges by indi-
vidual defendants. 47
Citizen participation in policy formulation is an extremely contro-
versial issue among many police administrators, who resent the intru-
sion of those they regard as lacking expertise or appreciation of the
policeman's task into the process of formulating policy. The short-
sightedness of this view was noted by the A.B.A. Committee in recom-
47. McGowan, supra note 44, at 686-87. It is arguable that within the federal judi-
cial system, pre-implementation review would be prohibited by the case-or-controversy
requirement of the Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. Il, § 2. See United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (federal employees not engaged in prohibited activities
failed to present a controversy when seeking a declaration that the Hatch Act was un-
constitutional). Judge McGowan considered this problem in light of Mitchell and
concluded that the case-or-controversy requirement would not appear "to bar pre-im-
plementation review of police regulations covering a wide range of police practices."
McGowan, supra, at 688 n.81.
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mending that police agencies effectively involve a representative cross-
section of citizens in the process of formulating police policy:
If the actions of police agencies are to have public support and ac-
ceptance, citizens must have a sense of involvement in the formulation
of policies which set the tone and character of police services for indi-
vidual communities ...
Reasonable means for citizen participation on these important issues
can do much to reduce the tensions in a community and the lack of
confidence in the government "to rectify perceived injustice." 48
Consideration of the policies of neighboring police departments is a
necessity dictated by the frequency of joint operations in which a local
police department may have to call upon a neighboring department to
send its officers to assist in an emergency. Nearly every department
surveyed was a party to some sort of "mutual assistance pact" with the
police departments of neighboring communities. Frequently, as many
as seven or eight departments were parties to such pacts. The confu-
sion created when each of these departments has a different policy as
to the use of deadly force is readily apparent. Thus, some effort to
reconcile policies among cooperating departments is required.
In measuring the process of formulation of policies regarding the
use of deadly force by the fifty police agencies in Los Angeles County
against these proposals, little input beyond the expertise of police ad-
ministrators was discernible. At the risk of oversimplification, the
process of policy formulation most frequently described proceeded
something like this:
The newly appointed Chief of Police discovers that the department has
no policy on the use of deadly force. He contacts several other de-
partments and asks them to send him copies of their policy statement.
He picks out the one he likes best and circulates it among his captains
or division commanders, asking for their comments. If he agrees with
the comments, they are incorporated into the policy statement, which
is then officially promulgated as a departmental regulation.
With few exceptions, most departments had no formal means of
soliciting the reaction of police officers below the administrative level
to proposed policies. Although this can be done informally in smaller de-
partments, two-thirds of the departments surveyed had over fifty
sworn personnel. While nearly every department had some sort of
"police association," an organization to which all uniformed personnel
48. THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, supra note 5, § 4.5, commentary at 139-40.
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belonged, such organizations were largely fraternal in concept. Where
they did exert some "muscle," it was only with respect to bargaining
for wages and working conditions. One notable exception was the
Los Angeles Fire & Police Protective League, which offered testimony
before the Los Angeles Police Commission opposing a number of pro-
visions in the new policy regarding the use of deadly force adopted by
the Commission in March, 1972.:9
None of the fifty departments surveyed had an in-house legal ad-
visor, although several departments did have administrators with legal
training. In most cases, any legal advice as to policy formulation
came from the city attorney. Since the city attorney is the one who
represents the city in civil litigation arising from police conduct, his
role as a police advisor in formulating policy was found to be a very
negative one. More than one police administrator interviewed related
that his city attorney was opposed to the department putting any
policy in writing, since such a written policy would only make it more
difficult to defend the city against civil liability.
The reactions of elected officials were seldom solicited by the police
administrators interviewed. In most cases, policies were simply pre-
sented to the city manager as a fait accompli. In many cities, police
policy was submitted to the city council, but approval by that body
was universally regarded as a mere formality. In none of the jurisdic-
tions contacted had any debate or controversy over formulation of
police policy on the use of firearms ever occurred in the city council.
The input of the prosecutor was found to be a forceful element in
formulation of some police policy in Los Angeles County. Through
a number of imaginative training and educational programs, the Los
Angeles County District Attorney exerts considerable influence among
police agencies. Numerous police officials spoke very highly of both the
Law Enforcement Bulletin published by the District Attorney and his
series of training films which is circulated via closed circuit television.5°
Neither of these sources had addressed the problem of policy regarding
the use of deadly force, however, but had rather restricted themselves
largely to the legal problems of gathering evidence.
No cases have been discovered in which the judiciary officially par-
ticipated in the policy formulation process. However, in a commenda-
49. See note 54 infra.
50. This program is now being sponsored on a state-wide basis by Attorney-General
Evqlle 1. Younger.
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ble effort to formulate a uniform policy among the seven police de-
partments which train their officers at Pasadena City College,5 the
Advisory Board for the training program sought the assistance of a
trial judge (in his individual capacity) held in universally high regard
by officials of the departments concerned.5 2  His perceptive analysis
of the differences among their individual policies proved of substantial
assistance in drafting a proposal for a uniform policy.
With the single exception of the Los Angeles Police Department, no
police agency in Los Angeles County was required to submit its poli-
cies to any type of citizen advisory board or police commission for ap-
proval.53  Nor were any less formal means of citizen participation in
policy formulation utilized by any department contacted. In Los An-
geles, police policy is set by a Police Commission, composed of five
members appointed for five year terms by the Mayor, subject to con-
firmation by the City Council. The commission seldom, if ever, dis-
regards the recommendations of the police chief as to policy, however.
The new firearms policy adopted in March, 1972, was identical to that
proposed by the Chief of Police.54
The absence of citizen input is most pronounced, of course, in those
cities which contract with the Los Angeles County Sheriff for police
services. At least in cities with their own police department, citizens
theoretically have indirect control over police policy by the pressure
they can exert upon elected officials to bring about the removal of a
police chief who promulgates policies which lack public confidence.
In the contract cities, however, the policy promulgated by the Los An-
geles County Sheriff is simply part of the "package"-the city can ex-
ert no influence to affect the policy by which the police officers serving
it will be governed.
51. See Table IV infra.
52. The individual selected was Judge Mortimer G. Franciscus of the Pasadena
Municipal Court.
53. A Police Commission was established in Compton in January, 1972, but has not
yet exerted any control over internal policy.
54. The new policy, which became effective in March, 1972, is to some extent less
restrictive than the former policy (set out at text accompanying notes 69-70 infra).
While the former policy offered examples of the "serious felonies" which might present
compelling circumstances to justify the use of firearms to capture fleeing felons, the
new policy provides:
It is not practical to enumerate specific felonies and state with certainty that the
escape of the perpetrator must be prevented at all costs, or that there are other
felonious crimes where the perpetrator must be allowed to escape rather than
shoot him. Such decisions are based upon sound judgment, not arbitrary check-
lists.
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With respect to consultation between and among neighboring police
departments in the formulation of policy, the interaction disclosed by
this survey was sporadic where it existed at all. While several instances
were found in which a department "borrowed" its policy from another
department, most such instances did not involve departments in the
same locality. For example, the policies of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department were
widely adopted by other departments.55  Although some of the adopt-
ing departments were in areas contiguous to those patrolled by the
L.A.P.D. or the Sheriff's Department, more often the reason offered to
explain the conformity was that the chief was formerly with the L.A.P.D.
or the Sheriff's Department, or felt that the research resources of these
larger departments entitled their policy formulation to greater considera-
tion. Some regional conformity in written policy seems to have been ac-
complished in the San Gabriel Valley, where most of the departments
which have adopted the "Chapman Model"'5 policy are located. There
are numerous local organizations of police officials which offer a
vehicle for the exchange of ideas on a regional basis. State-wide agencies
such as the California Peace Officers Association and the California
Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.)
5 7
have also attempted to encourage greater uniformity in policy, but with
sporadic success.
The monopolization of the process of policy formulation by police
administrators was evidenced by several other findings. The police
agencies contacted were asked whether their policies on the use of
deadly force had undergone any changes in the past ten years. It was
found that those departments which had instituted the fewest changes
generally were administered by a chief with relative longevity. Con-
versely, the reason most frequently cited to explain a change in policy
was that a new chief of police had been appointed.
V. THE PROMULGATION AND INTERPRETATION OF POLICY
If police policy is to achieve its ultimate objective of fostering uni-
formity in the exercise of discretion by individual officers, it must, of
course, be effectively communicated to those officers. Effective com-
munication requires the use of unambiguous language which can be
easily and clearly interpreted. If individual officers perceive and in-
terpret the policy diversely, the policy is useless, and may be worse
55. See text preceding and accompanying note 69 infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
57. See text accompanying notes 112-13 infra.
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than no policy at all. The search for the most effective means! of
achieving these objectives raises a host of related questions.
A. Should Policy be in Writing?
Whether administrative guidelines should be in the form of a written
policy is a question which is unsettled in the minds of many police ad-
ministrators. At least eight of the departments surveyed in Los An-
geles County have no written policy.58 This is not to suggest that their
officers are totally unrestrained, however. Rather, these departments
choose to rely solely upon training programs to inculcate their officers
with the kind of judgment they expect them to exercise when faced with
the decision whether to use deadly force. Thus, every department has
some "policy" in the sense that it seeks to achieve some degree of uni-
formity in the exercise of discretion by its officers. The reason most
frequently offered for orally communicated policy was a very pragmatic
one: if policy is in written form, it may be used against the department
to impose civil tort liability.
This fear, of course, is a very realistic one, at least in California. In
Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles,50 the California Supreme Court re-
versed a judgment in favor of the city in a suit for wrongful death aris-
ing out of a collision between a police car and an automobile driven
by the decedent. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought the admission in
evidence of a series of training bulletins issued by the Los Angeles
Police Department, which specified the conditions under which emer-
gency vehicles should be driven with red light and siren. In reversing,
the supreme court analogized the bulletins to the safety rules of an
employer, holding that they should have been admitted on three dif-
ferent theories: First, the bulletins constituted evidence of the standard
of due care applicable to the officer's course of conduct. Second,
the officer's failure to follow the directives in the bulletins constituted
evidence of his negligence. And third, the factual statements and
opinions contained in the bulletins were implied admissions by the
city's agents, admissible against the city as expert opinions relevant to
the issue of the decedent's lack of contributory negligence. The im-
plication of this ruling in the context of firearms policy is clear: a writ-
ten policy delineating when firearms should and should not be used
could be offered to prove the standard of due care in the use of fire-
58. Those departments are Bell, Bell Gardens, Claremont, El Monte, Lynwood,
Manhattan Beach, Signal Hill and Vernon.
59. 69 Cal. 2d 472, 446 P.2d 129, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968).
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arms by a police officer, and his violation of the policy would be evi-
dence of his negligence. Moreover, if the policy included any factual
statements or opinions, 60 they could be offered against the city as ad-
missions.
The applicability of the Dillenbeck reasoning to firearms policy need
no longer be based upon implication, however. In Grudt v. City of
Los Angeles, 1 a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a citizen
who was shot by plain-clothes detectives when he allegedly accelerated
his automobile toward a police officer after being pulled over for traf-
fic violations, the police tactical manual which specified when firearms
may be used had been excluded by the trial court on the grounds that
negligence was not in issue, since the officers fired intentionally. Rul-
ing that the negligence issue could be raised despite its inconsistency
with the theory of intentional tort, the California Supreme Court held
the tactical manual should have been admitted under both of the first
two theories expounded in Dillenbeck. Going a step beyond, the
Court noted that the tactical manual should have been admitted even
on the issue of intentional tort:
Even had the negligence issue been properly excluded from the case,
it is arguable that the manual was relevant to the remaining issue of in-
tentional tort. The rules on the use of firearms related to the issue of
the reasonableness of the force used for self-defense by the officers-
an issue which remained in the case on the cause of action predicated
upon an intentional tort.62
To some police administrators and city attorneys, these cases may be
read as dire warnings of the folly of putting police policy in writing.
The defendant in Dillenbeck had argued that a holding in favor of the
plaintiff would deter police administrators from formulating rules, urging
the analogy to the inadmissibility of safety precautions after an accident,
which are traditionally excluded from evidence on the ground that ad-
missibility would serve to deter post-accident repairs. The court re-
sponded:
This danger, however, is far less compelling than that attendant upon
repairs after an accident; unlike repairs, safety rules, by controlling em-
ployee behavior, almost certainly serve to minimize the employer's total
tort liability. . . . In any event, the legal principle that violation of
60. The written policies surveyed frequently abounded with statements of opinion.
Azusa, Compton, Inglewood and Monterrey Park, for example, have adopted an iden-
tical written explanation of their policies which contains statements such as: "The dis-
play of a weapon as a bluff is a dangerous practice."
61. 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970).
62. Id. at 588 n.4, 468 P.2d at 831 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4.
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safety rules constitutes nothing more than evidence of negligence, in
permitting the employer to argue that the rule does not represent the
standard of care or is inapplicable in a given situation, serves to mini-
mize any deterrent effect that admissibility into evidence might other-
wise portend.
63
The reassurance that violations of safety rules are only "evidence"
of negligence, thus leaving room for the employer to argue they do not
represent the standard, seems somewhat out of place in the context of
police policy. What else is policy except an attempt to set a standard?
Holding this carrot out is nothing less than an invitation to make policy
as ambiguous as possible. The simple truth is that the Dillenbeck and
Grudt rulings will deter and have deterred some police administrators
from producing a clear enunciation of policy."4 It is suggested, how-
ever, that such an attitude on the part of a police administrator reflects a
basic misconception of the whole purpose of policy. If policy is per-
ceived as a prophylactic device, designed for maximum flexibility in
"backing up" an officer in his decisions, it may well be that maximum
flexibility can be maintained by having no policy, or by not putting
policy in written form. If policy is perceived as a means of controlling
the conduct of police officers, however, a clearly formulated policy may
serve to limit liability by insuring that officers more consistently meet a
uniform standard of conduct.
From a more pragmatic standpoint, it is unlikely that a police de-
partment can escape tort liability by the simple expedient of declining
to put its policy in writing. First, as long as there is any policy, it will
be admissible under the Dillenbeck-Grudt theories regardless of
whether it is in writing or not. While the lack of written policy will
certainly create a serious problem of proof for plaintiff's counsel, it is
a problem which can be overcome by diligent and searching cross-
examination of the defendant police officer and the department ad-
ministrators and training officers.65 Secondly, and more important,
liability of a city may be premised on the lack of training and guidance
which it gives to its police officers. 6 Using this theory, it could be
63. 69 Cal. 2d at 481 n.5, 446 P.2d at 134 n.5, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27 n.5.
64. Recognizing this, the A.B.A. Committee recommended that a violation of ad-
ministrative policy "should not result in mandatory civil liability." Tm URBAN
POLICE FUNcrMON, supra note 5, § 4.4(b) (ii).
65. Even where policy is in written form, a searching cross-examination was held to
be permissible in Dillenbeck. 69 Cal. 2d at 482-83, 446 P.2d at 135-37, 72 Cal. Rptr.
at 327-29. Presumably, the scope would be expanded accordingly where policy was not
in written form.
66. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McAndrew v. Mularchuk,
33 NJ. 172, 162 A.2d 820, 88 A.L.R.2d 1313 (1960).
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successfully urged that a city which failed to provide clear policy guide-
lines to its police officers as to when they should and should not use
their firearms was itself negligent and should be held liable when an
officer injures someone in the use of his weapon.0 7
B. How Should Policy Be Interpreted?
Since policy is simply an administrative interpretation of the law,
ideally this interpretation should not require much further interpreta-
tion. It should be in such clear and unambiguous language that every
officer understands it in the same way. Although this ideal may be
unattainable, the goal should be sought.
Many of the written policy statements encountered in Los Angeles
County appear to be models of ambiguity, rather than clarity. It is
virtually impossible for an officer to understand the meaning of many
of these policy statements without some further clarification. For ex-
ample, one department offers the following guidance to its 67 officers
as to when they can shoot at fleeing felons:
In extreme cases, an officer may be justified in the use of his gun in re-
taking an escaped felon or in apprehending a person responsible for the
commission of a felony. . . . Each officer should consider not only
the legality of his actions but the apprbpriateness of any act in which
he uses firearms in any manner.08
The ambiguity of many of the policies examined is dramatically dem-
onstrated by the results of the testing of approximately 200 individual
police officers in six different departments. The results, which are
fully tabulated in Section VII of this article, dealing with the effectiveness
of policy as a control device, disclose a wide disparity among officers
in the same department in interpreting their department's policy.
The contrast between written policy and the varying interpretations
of that policy becomes even- more startling when analyzed in the con-
text of identical written policies adopted by more than one police de-
partment. Three striking examples of such disparity can be offered:
1. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Policy.
The policy adopted by the Los Angeles County Sheriff, and pres-
ently in effect, is as follows:
67. See Chapman, Police Policy on the Use of Firearms, THE POLICE CHIEF, July
1967, at 16; Rimmel, Police Firearms Training: An Inquiry into the Governmental
Duty to Provide Adequate Training, 3 THE NATIONAL RILEmAN, Aug. 1963, at 17.
68. Redondo Beach Police Department, Policy Statement.
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The following shall be the guide for personnel of the Los Angeles
County Sheriffs Department as to the use of force and firearms and
shall be the policy of the Sheriff concerning these matters.
1. That we do not use firearms or force likely to produce great bodily
injury upon any person who is arrested solely on a misdemeanor
charge.
2. That in all arrests (felony or misdemeanor) we do not employ any
more force than is absolutely necessary.
3. That all arrests for a felony charge be based on reasonable cause
determined from credible or observed acts.
4. That it is the full responsibility of each individual Deputy Sheriff
to use firearms only when absolutely necessary and fully justified
by circumstances.
5. That firearms must be regarded as defensive weapons and are to
be used as a last resort.
6. That each Deputy Sheriff involved in the shooting of a person is
subject to the same type of civil action for damages as may be
brought against any citizen under such circumstances.
7. That Deputies are not to be restricted in the lawful performance
of their duty. They have a positive duty to use firearms when the
necessity exists in the protection of their own life and the lives of
others.
While the written policy does not prohibit the use of deadly force to
capture fleeing felons who present no immediate danger to others, it
could be so interpreted by virtue of the reference to firearms as "de-
fensive weapons" and the caveat that a duty to use firearms exists
when necessary to protect a deputy's life and the lives of others. On
the other hand, the specific prohibition against the use of firearms
upon persons arrested solely on a misdemeanor charge is pregnant with
the implication that firearms can be used upon those arrested for fel-
onies. Evidently, however, the former iiterpretation is that adopted by
the Sheriff's Office. In responding to the five hypotheticals, the Sheriff's
Office fell into the most-restrictive category by indicating that in none of
the five situations would the use of deadly force be within its policy.
This identical written policy has been adopted by at least six other
police departments in Los Angeles County: Azusa, Compton, Covina,
Downey, Inglewood and Monterey Park. Yet in only two of these,
Compton and Downey, is the policy interpreted the same way as it is by
the Sheriff's Office. Two other departments, Azusa and Monterey
Park, interpret the policy to allow the use of deadly force to capture a
suspect fleeing from an armed robbery, even if he is known to be a
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juvenile (the third and fourth hypotheticals). Inglewood interprets
the identical policy to allow deadly force to capture a fleeing burglary
suspect as well as an armed robbery suspect (hypotheticals one and
three) but to preclude deadly force in either situation if the suspect is
known to be a juvenile. Finally, Covina interprets the policy as plac-
ing no restrictions on the provisions of the Penal Code whatsoever, al-
lowing the use of deadly force in all five hypothetical situations.
2. The Former Los Angeles Police Department Policy.
Although it is no longer the policy of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment,69 the written policy in effect in that department until this year
was widely adopted by other police departments in Los Angeles
County, including Montebello, Palos Verdes Estates, San Marino, Tor-
rance and West Covina. The policy provides:
LEGAL LIMITATIONS. Police officers may use firearms only un-
der certain restricted, justifiable circumstances. Penal Code Sections
196 and 197 delineate the California law of justifiable homicide.
It is the law that a police officer must not discharge his firearm except
in limited situations. No officer has the right to extend this power, but
must decide his action in light of the circumstances confronting him
within the limitations of his authority.
SELF DEFENSE. An officer is entitled to use deadly force when it is
necessary to save himself, a citizen, a brother officer, or a prisoner
from death or grave bodily harm. He is not permitted to use deadly
force to protect himself from assaults which are not likely to have seri-
ous results.
MISDEMEANANTS. An officer may not use deadly force to effect
the arrest or prevent the escape of a person who has committed a mis-
demeanor. This restriction does not infringe upon an officer's right
of self defense should he be attacked.
SUSPECTED FELONY OFFENDERS. An officer should not shoot
at a person who is called upon to halt upon mere suspicion and, who,
simply runs away to avoid arrest.
KNOWN FELONY OFFENDERS. The firearm must not be dis-
charged at persons who are running away to escape arrest except under
compelling circumstances in felony cases. For example, 'if the officer
actually sees a person com t a serious felony such as murder, rape,
assault with a deadly weapon, or robbery, he may shoot to prevent es-
cape if the offender cannot be apprehended by any other reasonable
means.
69. See note 54 supra.
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FLEEING JUVENILES. The rules pertaining to self defense are
equally applicable to juveniles as a suspect can never be considered
less dangerous merely because of his youth. However, in the event
officers are pursuing a fleeing felony offender believed to be a juvenile,
they shall not shoot even though the suspect ignores the officers' com-
mands to halt.
PROTECTION OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC. Regardless of the na-
ture of the crime or the legal justification for firing at a suspect, officers
should remember that their basic responsibility is to protect the public.
Officers should be particularly cautious when firing, under conditions
that would subject bystanders to possible injury or death.
WARNING SHOTS. Warning shots shall not be fired in an attempt
to induce the surrender of a suspect.
With respect to fleeing felons, the phrase "compelling circumstances"
is subject to a wide range of interpretations, although the examples
provided seem to suggest that only felonies in which force had been
used against the victim should be included. The policy appears to be
unambiguous in limiting the use of deadly force against juveniles to
self-defense situations. Yet, none of the five departments which have
adopted this model as their written policy interprets it in the same way!
In San Marino, the policy is read as precluding the use of deadly force
in all five of the hypothetical situations presented. In Palos Verdes Es-
tates, the policy is interpreted to allow deadly force to be used only in
the situation of the third hypothetical, a fleeing armed robbery suspect.
West Covina would permit deadly force to be used against a fleeing
armed robbery suspect even if he were known to be a juvenile, how-
ever, interpreting the self-defense provision as applicable to any suspect
who is armed. In Montebello, "compelling circumstances" would be
found in the case of either the fleeing burglary suspect or the fleeing
armed robbery suspect, although deadly force could not be used in
either situation if the suspect were known to be a juvenile. Torrance
interprets the policy to allow the use of deadly force in all of the first
four hypothetical situations, although the use of deadly force against
known juveniles is specifically allowed by modifying the section on
FLEEING JUVENILES to delete the second sentence and add "The
provisions of 'known felony offenders' shall apply."
3. The Chapman Model Policy.
A model police policy on the use of firearms was written by Samuel
G. Chapman, Assistant Director of the President's Commission on
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Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.7 0  This policy
provides as follows:
I. POLICY
The policy of this department is that members shall exhaust every other,
reasonable means of apprehension before resorting to the use of fire-
arms.
II. REGULATIONS
A. An officer shall not discharge firearms in the performance of his
police duties except under the following circumstances and after
all other means fail:
1. In the necessary defense from death or serious injury of an-
other person attacked.
2. In the necessary defense of himself from death or serious in-
jury when attacked.
3. To effect an arrest, to prevent an escape, or to recapture an
escapee when other means have failed, of a felon suspect when:
a. The crime for which the arrest is sought involved conduct
including the use or threatened use of deadly force; and
b. There is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is
sought will cause death or serious bodily harm if his ap-
prehension is delayed.
4. To kill a dangerous animal or one that humanity requires its
removal from further suffering, and other disposition is im-
practical.
5. To give alarm or to call assistance for an important purpose
when no other means can be used.
6. For target practice at an approved range.
B. Firearms shall not be discharged under the following circumstances:
1. As a warning.
2. At moving or fleeing vehicles unless the circumstances come
within the provisions of Section II A, 1, and 3 of this policy.
The Chapman model has been made available in California through
the cooperation of the California Commission on Peace Officers Stand-
ards and Training.71 At least eight police departments in Los Angeles
County have apparently patterned their written policies after the Chap-
man model: Alhambra, Arcadia, Culver City, Glendora, La Verne,
Monrovia, Pomona, and Sierra Madre. While this policy is interpreted
70. Chapman, Police Policy on the Use of Firearms, THE POLICE CHIEF, July, 1967,
at 34-36.
71. See text accompanying notes 112-13 infra.
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more uniformly than either the County Sheriffs or the former Los
Angeles Police Department's- policies, the departments adopting the
Chapman model still fall into two "camps" with respect to their inter-
pretations of the fleeing felon provisions. Alhambra and La Verne
would interpret the policy to preclude the use of deadly force against
either the fleeing burglary suspect in the first hypothetical or the flee-
ing armed robbery suspect in the third hypothetical. The remaining
six departments, however, would interpret the policy to allow the use
of deadly force against the fleeing armed robbery suspect.
A number of instances were discovered in which the responses to
the hypotheticals by the police administrator interviewed could not be
reconciled with the written policy statement supplied by the depart-
ment. Many of these situations did not involve ambiguous policy
statements, but direct contradiction between the written policy and the
way it is interpreted. For example, Baldwin Park and South Pasa-
dena, both Category IV departments which indicated that shooting a
known juvenile fleeing an armed robbery would not be within their
policy, but shooting a fleeing adult in the same situation would be, sup-
plied written policies which were completely silent as to juvenile sus-
pects. Glendora, a Category IlI department which indicated shooting
the juvenile armed robbery suspect in the third hypothetical would be
within its policy, supplied a written policy which clearly provides:
An officer shall not fire at persons known to be or suspected of being
juveniles except . . . in the necessary defense of himself from death
or serious injury when attacked . . . [or] in the necessary defense
from death or serious injury of another person attacked.
Maywood, a Category III department which distinguished between
the fleeing burglary suspect and the fleeing armed robbery suspect,
offered a written policy which allows the use of firearms "to effect
the arrest of a felony suspect when other means of arrest have failed,
or to prevent the escape of a felon," without qualification.
Whether these discrepancies indicate that a department's actual pol-
icy may differ from what is in writing is a legitimate question. Some
of the police administrators interviewed were very frank in conceding
that their department had an "unwritten' policy which was more re-
strictive than what was in writing-but they hesitated to put these ad-
ditional restrictions in writing, for fear of civil liability consequences.
Incredibly, one department conceded it actually had two sets of written
policies-one very broad policy, which was the "official" policy availa-
ble to "back up" an officer if necessary, the other a much more-re-
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strictive "field service" policy supplied to patrol officers, which could
be used to discipline an officer internally!
C. How Should Policy Be Taught?
The frequent ambiguity of written policy statements emphasizes the
importance of training as an adjunct to policy promulgation. As
noted by the Task Force on the Police of the President's Crime Com-
mission:
However successful a draftsman may be in building clarity and pre-
ciseness into a policy statement, dependence cannot be placed upon the
written word in order to achieve effective implementation. Opportuni-
ties must be afforded for officers at the lowest level in the organization
to ask questions and, more importantly, to gain a full understanding
of how the policy came about and why it is important that it be im-
plemented. An officer who knows why a policy is adopted is more
likely to comply with it and, to the extent that he identifies with the new
policy, is more likely to work toward its successful implementation.7
2
The most important stage in the training of a police officer is the
orientation he receives as a recruit. It is at this point he can most ef-
fectively be inculcated with the kind of judgment he must exercise in
the use of a weapon. Undoubtedly, this can most effectively be ac-
complished when the new recruit is being taught the mechanics of how
to use his weapon.
The plethora of smaller departments in Los Angeles County are not
in a position, of course, to sustain their own separate training acade-
mies for new recruits. They use a number of training programs which
offer basic recruit training on a contractual basis. The largest such
program is that operated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office,
which currently trains recruits for eighteen other police departments in
Los Angeles County. The academy operated by the Long Beach
Police Department trains recruits for three neighboring departments.
Two junior colleges have developed ambitious programs for the train-
ing of police recruits: Rio Hondo College, used by thirteen different
departments, and Pasadena City College, used by seven departments.
While each of these programs includes intensive training in the use
of firearms, the great disparity among the policies regarding the use of
deadly force adopted by the departments which send their recruits to
the facility precludes any effective orientation to departmental policy
during this crucial phase of recruit training. For example, both Rio
72. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.
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Hondo College and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Academy train
recruits for departments in each of the five categories of restrictive-
ness. In Table IV, this diversity is illustrated by indicating the cate-
gory of restrictiveness of the policy of each of the departments using
these four training programs.
TABLE IV
L. A. County Pasadena
Category Sheriff's Rio Hondo City Long Beach
Academy College College P. D. Academy
I. Hawthorne El Monte Burbank
II. Beverly Hills Bell Signal Hill
Gardena Bell Gardens
Inglewood Montebello
ImI. Arcadia Azusa Monrovia
Culver City Huntington Pk. Sierra Madre
Glendora Lynwood
Monterey Park Maywood
Redondo Beach Pomona
Santa Monica
Vernon
IV. El Segundo Baldwin Park San Gabriel Hermosa Beach
Southgate So. Pasadena Long Beach
Palos Verdes
Estates
V. Compton Irwindale Pasadena
Downey San Marino
Glendale
Manhattan Beach
San Fernando
The net result of this diversity is that none of these training pro-
grams teaches recruits much more than the Penal Code provisions re-
garding the use of deadly force, leaving it up to each individual de-
partment to teach departmental policy to their own recruits. The
problem is handled at the Sheriff's Academy by concentrating most of
those portions of the training dealing with Sheriff's Department policy
at the end of the 26 week course, so that other department's recruits
can complete their basic training prior to the Sheriff's own recruits.
The undesirability of this bifurcation has been recognized at Pasa-
dena City College, and an effort is under way to convince all of the
departments using the training program to adopt a uniform policy which
can be taught as part of recruit training.
The departmental programs used to teach policy to new recruits
leave much to be desired in many of the agencies surveyed. Fre-
quently, the recruit is simply given a copy of the department's policy
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manual which he is expected to read on his own. Many of the smaller
departments lack a full-time training officer, so the training of recruits
is left to an administrator who is burdened with numerous other re-
sponsibilities.
Once the recruit has become a regular member of the force, few de-
partments provide for any periodic review of policy as part of their in-
service training. Nearly every department requires its officers to qual-
ify regularly at a shooting range, but the emphasis is decidedly upon
accuracy in shooting, rather than judgment in when to shoot. Those
departments with regular training officers use training bulletins on a
regular basis as "refreshers," but even these departments seldom have
any set program to ensure review on a regular basis. More often, re-
views of shooting policy are occasioned by an incident in which an
officer has discharged a weapon in questionable circumstances. While
a critique of an actual incident is certainly an excellent training device,
it appears that most departments simply wait for the incident to hap-
pen, rather than using a backlog of examples for regular review. One
notable exception is the California Highway Patrol, which regularly
issues a training publication called "Routine Stops," in which a num-
ber of selected incidents are described and critiqued on a regular basis.
When a department revises its policy, the revision is ordinarily
brought to the attention of all uniformed personnel at the roll-calls
which mark the beginning of each shift. Most of the departments sur-
veyed have policy manuals of one sort or another which are distributed
to each member of the department, and revisions are distributed to
each officer for insertion in his copy of the manual. More than a few
departments, however, do not expect each officer to maintain his own
policy manual, but keep several "desk copies" at the station for refer-
ence purposes. One chief of police interviewed was somewhat em-
barrassed to discover his own reference copy of the policy manual did
not contain the latest revisions to his policy on the use of deadly force.
One may question the effectiveness of bulletins and/or lectures, no
matter how regularly presented, as devices to teach an officer what
kind of judgment he should use in a situation of stress. However, few
departments appear to have heeded the advice of the Task Force on the
Police of the President's Crime Commission:
If adequate policies exist, they can best be communicated to the in-
dividual officer by a problem approach to training rather than the
more traditional lecture form of police training. The problem ap-
proach, if done well, serves to test whether the training staff under-
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stands the important situations encountered in the field and whether
existing policies are adequately responsive to these situations.
78
The most effective method of teaching would certainly be to simulate
the stress as realistically as possible, to test the officer's reaction when
faced with a situation in which he must exercise his judgment as to
whether he should shoot. Encouragingly, some departments are ex-
perimenting with this type of training. The Redondo Beach Police
Department has conducted training exercises much like military "war
games," in which officers are called upon to capture a fleeing robber.
The Los Angeles Police Department is perfecting an elaborate simula-
tion system under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration. The Torrance Department uses their own video tape
equipment to prepare simulations of stress situations to train their of-
ficers. Unfortunately, such experimentation is apparently limited to
the larger departments which can draw upon their greater manpower and
financial resources.
D. Should Policy Be Publicized?"'
Only five of the departments contacted refused to furnish copies of
their written policies on the use of deadly force: Beverly Hills, Her-
mosa Beach, Long Beach, Santa Monica and the California Highway
Patrol. Although representatives of each of these departments were
willing to discuss their policy fully, they indicated they would not re-
lease written copies of their policy except in response to a subpoena.
The reason most frequently offered for this position was the fear that
publication of their policy would make their job more difficult: if
fleeing felons were aware that deadly force could not be used, they
would ignore an officer's command to stop.
Even assuming this reason is a valid one, the inconsistency of this
position bears comment. While willing to describe their policy orally
with the understanding that the purpose of the inquiry was a research
project to be published, they were unwilling to risk having the actual
policy itself published. Unless the written policy differs from the oral
description, the goal of secrecy would seemingly preclude an oral des-
cription of the policy as well as distribution of the policy itself. More-
over, if the written policy could be reached by subpoena, its secrecy
73. Id.
74. Many of the issues concerning publication of police policy are identical to the
arguments regarding publication of prosecutor's policies, thoroughly treated in Abrams,
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1, 25-34 (1971).
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could in no way be assured once a subpoena had compelled its produc-
tion in a public court proceeding. This inconsistency is especially
striking in the case of the Long Beach Police Department. Although
the request for a copy of their written policy was firmly declined, sub-
sequent research disclosed that the Long Beach Police Department had
responded to a 1964 survey conducted by the Cincinnati Police De-
partment by supplying a copy of its policy, which has been published
and is available through the library of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police.7
5
In addition, the attempt to maintain the secrecy of police policy may
well be a violation of California law. The California Public Records
Act,70 clearly applicable to local agencies such as police departments,
7
7
provides that every citizen has a right to inspect any "public record,"
defined as "any writing containing information relating to the conduct
of the public's business.17 8  While the Act permits an agency to with-
hold a record if it can demonstrate "that on the facts of the particular
case the public interest served by not making the record public clearly
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record,"1 0
the justification offered by these departments does not appear to meet
this standard.
First, the argument that fleeing felons will tailor their actions to the
police policy of a particular jurisdiction is even more implausible than
the suggestion that those who plan to commit crimes consult the de-
cisions of the appellate courts.8 Second, a fleeing felon has no as-
surance as to which police department's officers may be pursuing him;
in view of the disparity of policy in Los Angeles County, a felon would
have to undertake a good deal of research to be sure that the officer in
pursuit was governed by one policy rather than another. Third, it
is highly unlikely that most fleeing felons are completely confident
that the pursuing officer will respond only in full conformity to the
written policy of his department. It is more likely he assumes the risk
of flight on the assumption that a moving target is hard to hit. Fi-
nally, the vast majority of departments which make their written poli-
75. See note 7 supra. Long Beach has not altered or changed its policy since 1961.
76. CAr.. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 6250-60 (West Supp. 1972).
77. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 6252(b) (West Supp. 1972).
78. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1972).
79. CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 6255 (West Supp. 1972).
80. McGowan, supra note 44, at 661. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial
Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda,
66 MICH. L. Rnv. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statis-
tical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967).
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cies public report no discernible difference in the number of fleeing
felons compared with those few departments which attempt to keep
their policies secret.
The countervailing public interest in disclosure is indeed a weighty
one. If the goal of police policy is the control of police conduct, pub-
lic scrutiny is the most effective means of achieving that objective. As
noted by the Task Force on the Police of the President's Crime Com-
mission:
Emphasis on methods for disseminating and communicating policies
reflects the assumption that openness, affording a opportunity for
public criticism, is of major importance as a protection against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. It follows that policies of
administrative agencies, including those of the police, ought not to be
kept secret except in those exceptional cases in which confidentiality is
necessary in order to maintain their effectiveness. 81
Much the same thought has been expressed by Professor Davis,
whose conclusions were relied upon by the A.B.A. Committee in rec-
ommending that police policy be "openly" formulated, implemented
and reevaluated:
82
Openness is the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in
the fight against injustice. We should enlist it much more than we do.
When plans and policies and rules are kept secret, as through confiden-
tial instructions to staffs, private parties are prevented from checking ar-
bitrary or unintended departures from them. 83
VI. THE ENFORCEMENT OF POLICY
A police department's internal policies will be no more than window
dressing unless they are backed up by an internal program of disci-
plinary sanctions for violations of policy. As noted by the Police Task
Force:
Internal discipline can be swifter and, because imposed by the officers'
own superiors, more effective. If properly carried out, internal dis-
cipline can assure the public that the department's policies . . . are
fully meant and enforced. This is particularly true when the depart-
ment's own investigation discovers misconduct without any citizen com-
plaint.
Strong discipline shows the public that misconduct is merely the ac-
tion of individual officers-the few who violate the rules in any organ-
81. TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.
82. THm URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, supra note 5, § 4.5, commentary at 140.
83. K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JusTICE 98 (1969).
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ization-and not action which is customarily tolerated in the depart-
ment.8
4
The Police Task Force found serious deficiencies in the internal dis-
ciplinary procedures in most of the metropolitan police departments
which it examined. Some of the reasons for these deficiencies were
suggested by the A.B.A. Advisory Committee on the Police Function:
Police administrators are reluctant to articulate proper standards of
police conduct which may be controversial among the rank and file and
which may affect the outcome of criminal cases and potential civil and
criminal actions against individual officers. Further, many police ad-
ministrators are caught up in the bureaucratic requirements of civil
service which restrict their right to discipline officers for misconduct.86
Enforcement of policy as to the use of deadly force, of course, pre-
sents these difficulties in their most exacerbated form. The wide-
spread publicity which accompanies a police shooting incident fre-
quently places a police chief squarely in the middle-with indignant
community groups demanding severe sanctions against the police officer
lined up against the rank and file of the department, who demand that
the officer be "backed up. ' 6  Looming on the horizon, almost in-
evitably today, is a lawsuit for damages against the city, as well as pos-
sible civil service hearings if the officer appeals any disciplinary action.
Thus, a standard enforcement procedure is needed to insure that in-
ternal discipline is fairly and impartially administered, divorced from
public clamor, yet unmotivated by the natural tendency to "save face"
or "preserve departmental morale."
In surveying Los Angeles County police agencies regarding their
policies on the use of deadly force, an attempt was made to gather
some preliminary data with respect to the enforcement of policy.
While the effectiveness of internal discipline would best be measured
by an analysis of individual cases on a prolonged and systematic
basis,8 7 some generalizations based upon this preliminary data may
provide a helpful starting point for such analysis.
84. TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 193-94.
85. Trm URBAN POLICE FutcnoN, supra note 5, § 5.3, commentary at 159.
86. See H. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 167.
87. Such an analysis was recently attempted in Chicago. University of Chicago,
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, Citizen Review of Police Misconduct: or "Who
Will Watch the Watchmen?", REPORT TO THE POLICE-CoMMUNITY RELATIONS SUB-
CoMmrITEE OF THE C'mcAGo BAR ASSOCIATION. The lack of access to official police
records, however, hampered this effort considerably. More revealing studies may
emerge from New York, where Police Commissioner Murphy recently offered a
group of law "professors full access to the department's records for purposes of
scholarly research. McGowan, supra note 44, at 675.
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A number of basic similarities were found among nearly all the de-
partments surveyed. Virtually every department required that every
incident in which a firearm was discharged by an officer be reported to
a superior officer. The incident is then reviewed through the chain of
command, with a decision ultimately being made by the chief as to
whether the firearm discharge was within departmental policy. Any
investigation of the incident required is made by the department's de-
tective division. Although the largest departments have a regular "in-
ternal affairs" division of investigative personnel for this purpose, such
units are apparently beyond the means of smaller departments.88  A
few departments automatically suspend an officer from patrol duty
while an investigation is pending. 9 This too appears to be a luxury
the smaller, frequently undermanned departments cannot afford.
Most of the larger departments have a board of officers which re-
views the incident and makes a recommendation to the chief. In the
smaller departments, every incident is personally reviewed by the
chief.
Once a determination is made that a firearm discharge is outside
the department's policy, the discipline to be imposed is invariably up
to the chief. The options available to him include (1) referring the
matter to the District Attorney for prosecution of the officer involved;
(2) discharging the officer involved; (3) suspending the officer in-
volved; or (4) reprimanding the officer involved, either orally or in
writing.
Each of the departments surveyed was asked to supply statistical
information as to the shooting incidents found to be outside of policy
for the years 1970 and 1971. Results as to each department respond-
ing are tabulated in Table VI, infra. County-wide, 25 of the total of
189 shooting incidents reported for 1970 were found to be outside de-
partmental policy, while 27 of the 236 incidents reported for 1971
were declared to be outside policy. Thus, on an annual basis, approxi-
mately 12% of all incidents in which police discharge firearms are outside
their department's policy. As reflected in Table VII, infra, there does
not seem to be much correlation between the category of restrictive-
ness of departmental policy and the rate of incidents outside policy, al-
though a consistently low rate of shootings outside of policy was re-
ported among Category V departments, those with the most restrictive
88. The A.B.A. Study recommends that internal investigative procedures be estab-
lished in all departments. TnE UAN POLICE FuNcTION, supra note 5, § 5.4.
89. The Inglewood and Los Angeles Police Departments automatically suspend offi-
cers pending such an investigation.
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policy. A word of caution should be voiced with respect to this data,
however. One should not conclude, simply because a department re-
ports a high rate of incidents as outside of policy, that its officers are
less restrained in the use of their weapons. This could simply reflect a
department which takes its internal discipline more seriously, with less
reluctance to find a violation of its policy. This cautionary note is
motivated by the stark contrast between the data supplied by the Los
Angeles Police Department and the statistics provided by the Los An-
geles County Sheriff's Office. For the two-year period 1970-71,
L.A.P.D. reported that 34 out of a total of 258 incidents were outside
departmental policy, or 13%. The Sheriff's Office, on the other
hand, reported that only 1 out of 82 incidents for the same period was
outside their policy. Whether this contrast indicates a substantial dif-
ference in the degree of restraint exercised by their officers, or a dif-
ference in the strictness with which policy is enforced, or both, is a
question which can only be resolved by a study of the individual inci-
dents involved.
The responding departments were further asked to describe the dis-
ciplinary action taken in the incidents found to be outside of policy.
Since this infomation was not provided by the Los Angeles Police De-
partment, only nine of the incidents found to be outside policy in each
of the two years can be described. This data is presented in Table V.
TABLE V
DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN 1970 1971
Referred for Criminal Prosecution 1 0
Discharge of Officer 1 1
Suspension of Officer 1 1
Reprimand of Officer 4 5
No Discipline 2 2
A number of reasons might be suggested for the apparent infre-
quency with which the more severe sanctions are imposed. First,
nearly all the incidents in which a suspension, discharge, or criminal
prosecution ensued were incidents in which the discharge of the fire-
arm resulted in the wounding or killing of a suspect by the police offi-
cer. Apparently, the severest discipline is reserved for those incidents
which have the most serious consequences. Another reason may be
the bureaucratic difficulty of imposing the more severe sanctions. In
nearly every department surveyed any disciplinary action beyond a
reprimand could be appealed to some sort of civil service board or
panel. Most of the police administrators interviewed were very cog-
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nizant of the type of showing required at a civil service hearing, and
were extremely reluctant to undergo such a hearing without a very
strong case. Many indicated that a past record of more than one vio-
lation of departmental policy was almost a prerequisite. Thus, very
rarely would an officer be suspended or discharged for his first viola-
tion of departmental policy. 0 A third reason for reluctance to dis-
cipline may be the specter of civil liability. As articulated by the
A.B.A. Advisory Committee on the Police Function:
At the present time, police departments are often reluctant to proceed
against police officers until pending criminal cases (in which the ex-
clusionary rule may apply) or civil or criminal cases against the police
officer based upon his actions are resolved. The reasons for this relate
primarily to the fear that adverse administrative action against the offi-
cer may be prejudicial to a pending criminal case or to the criminal or
civil liability of the officer. This concern exists even in those cases
where the factors which may result in departmental disciplinary action
are different from those which could result in the exclusion of evidence
or the civil or criminal liability of the officer.91
This reluctance persists despite the rule that administrative disciplinary
action taken against a police officer is apparently inadmissible against
the city to prove negligence or culpable conduct since such action
could constitute subsequent remedial conduct.92  If the internal ad-
90. Such a policy could expose a city to liability for its own negligence in the know-
ing retention of a dangerous or incompetent officer. Foote, Tort Remedies for Po-
lice Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MinN. L. REv. 493, 514-15 (1955). An offi-
cer's prior record of disciplinary action has been held subject to discovery in a suit
against the city arising from his conduct.
91. THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, supra note 5, § 4.4, commentary at 137. See
also Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Author-
ity, 58 J. CauM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 168 (1967).
92. CAL. Evvm. CODE § 1151 (West 1968). The courts have long refused to admit
evidence of subsequent remedial conduct after an accident for the purpose of proving
negligence. Many early cases refused to admit such evidence because it was considered
irrelevant on the question of negligence. E.g. Engel v. United Traction Co., 203 N.Y.
321, 96 N.E. 731 (1911); Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202
(1892). Other cases acknowledge that the predominant reason for excluding such evi-
dence is not lack of probative significance but a policy against discouraging the tak-
ing of safety measures. See Ashland Supply Co. v. Webb, 206 Ky. 184, 266 S.W. 1086
(1924). California recognizes that it is this extrinsic policy against discouraging later
corrective action which forms the basis for the exclusionary rule:
The admission of evidence of subsequent repairs to prove negligence would sub-
stantially discourage persons from making repairs after the occurrence of an
accident. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151, Comment-Law Revision Commission.
It would appear that evidence of disciplinary proceedings by a police department
after a shooting incident is within the scope of the exclusionary rule of section 1151.
The Law Revision Commission makes it clear that this section was intended to codify
the common law rule excluding evidence of safety measures after an accident. CAL.
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ministrative investigation is still pending, and no final action has been
taken, investigative files of the police department may be protected
from discovery in a civil action, either on a theory of limited executive
privilege,9 3 or based upon the attorney-client privilege.94  Nevertheless,
the temptation is strong to put off any final disciplinary action against a
police officer until civil litigation is disposed of. Earlier action may be
necessary, however, since disciplinary action against a city employee is
frequently governed by a short statute of limitations. 0
Despite the temptation to wait, the Los Angeles Police Department
generally proceeds with internal discipline regardless of its potential ef-
fect upon civil litigation. For example, the officers involved in the al-
leged beating of singer Jimmie Rodgers were disciplined by the depart-
ment while the civil suit filed by Rodgers was still pending.9 Only in
one recent case, apparently, was an internal investigation suspended dur-
ing the pendency of litigation: the shooting of two Mexican nationals
by Los Angeles police officers in July of 1970. This exception was
explained on the grounds that a thorough investigation had already
been completed by the District Attorney's Office and that the federal
prosecution of the officers was "politically motivated.
'0 7
Evm. CODE § 1151, Comment-Law Revision Commission. And the common law rule
was sufficiently broad to exclude subsequent disciplinary actions taken by an employer
against the negligent employee. See Armour & Co. v. Skene, 153 F. 241 (1st Cir.
1907) (excluding evidence of the discharge of a driver one year after an accident);
Engel v. United Traction Co., supra (excluding evidence of the discharge of an em-
ployee after an accident on the question of negligence).
Despite the language of section 1151, it seems that evidence of subsequent disci-
plinary action is routinely admitted by local courts on the question of negligence. Ac-
cording to George I. Franscell, Assistant City Attorney, City of Los Angeles, the city
has been unsuccessful in blocking the admission of such evidence on the authority of
section 1151; disciplinary action has been admitted as an implied admission on the au-
thority of Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 472, 446 P.2d 129, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 321 (1968) (see text accompanying notes 59-60 supra). Reliance on Dillen-
beck is misplaced since that case, involving admission of training bulletins, clearly did
not involve evidence which could be considered as subsequent remedial conduct. Mr.
Franscell is unaware of any cases pending appeal on this question.
93. Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1968); United States v. Mackey,
239 F. Supp. 733 (D.D.C. 1965). But see Carter v. Carlson, 11 Cr. L. Rptr. 2525
(D.D.C. 1972); Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7 (1972).
94. Cf. D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700,
36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964); Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025
(1954); Jessup v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P.2d 177 (1957).
95. E.g., Los Angeles City Charter § 202 (1971), which specifies a one year limita.
tion period.
96. Interview with George J. Franscell, Assistant City Attorney, Los Angeles,
California, October 17, 1972.
97. Id.
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Although the results of internal disciplinary proceeding may be
available to the civil litigant who is astute enough to ask for them in
discovery proceedings,9 8 such results are not generally publicized.
Thus, the very cogent reasons for full public disclosure of the results
of police disciplinary proceedings advanced by the Police Task Force
have been largely ignored:
Once the decision on a complaint has been made, the complainant
should be notified of the decision and of the basis for it. And the pub-
lic should have access to the facts of the case and the nature of the de-
cision. Unless the public has access to reliable information, it is likely
to assume the worst. . . An annual report by the police department
providing such facts as the number and kinds of complaints, the kinds
of people who made them, the disposition of the complaint, and the
punishments imposed can also make a useful contribution to better
public understanding.99
VII. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY TO CONTROL POLICE BEHAVIOR
In urging the importance of policy formulation, promulgation and
enforcement, the underlying assumption is that departmental policy
will somehow affect the decisions made by individual police officers in
individual cases. This is an assumption which is very difficult to test.
Many police administrators shared the initial haunting suspicion of
this author that in the last analysis, policy statements may not mean
much when an officer is in a stress situation. His decision may be
more profoundly affected by the basic attitudes and personality char-
acteristics he brought with him when he was hired as a police officer.
To some extent, these attitudes may be reinforced or dispelled by his
training. But policy manuals might well be meaningless in the context
of decisions made under stress, such as the decision to use deadly force.
On the other hand, policy statements might be the clearest reflection
of what kinds of attitudes pervade a particular police department. By
means of a clearly articulated and meaningfully enforced policy, a mes-
sage may be conveyed which profoundly affects individual officers by
warning them that their conduct under stress will be evaluated by their
superiors against an objective standard.
In order to reach some tentative conclusions as to how effectively
policy controls the conduct of police officers, two different devices
were used in this survey. First, statistics reflecting the actual number
98. Apparently, most litigants do not include, in their requests for discovery, the
results of police disciplinary proceedings. Id.
99. TAsK FORCE RPORRT, supra note 5, at 197.
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of incidents in which firearms were discharged in each department sur-
veyed were collected to compare the number of incidents with the de-
gree of restrictiveness of the department's policy. Second, an at-
tempt was made to test the perceptions and reactions of individual pol-
ice officers within a department, to see whether they were guided by
their perceptions of departmental policy in their reactions to hypo-
thetical stress situations. Their reactions were then compared to those
of officers in other departments with different policies.
The results of these two comparisons were apparently inconsistent.
The statistical data reflected a direct relationship between the restric-
tiveness of policy and the number of actual shooting incidents; the hy-
pothetical testing, however, while disclosing a strong relationship be-
tween the officer's perception of policy and his reaction to hypothetical
situations, did not reflect a relationship between the actual policy and
the officer's reaction. An hypothesis will be offered, however, which
reconciles and explains this apparent inconsistency.
A. The Relationship of Policy to Shooting Incidents.
If police policy regarding the use of deadly force does act as a re-
straining influence upon police officers, then those departments with
the most restrictive policies should have relatively fewer incidents in
which firearms are discharged than those departments with less restric-
tive policies. 100 In order to test this theory, each of the fifty depart-
ments contacted was asked to supply statistical information regarding
the total number of incidents in which firearms were discharged by its
officers, breaking the total down to indicate how many of the incidents
were within the departmental policy related to self-defense or defense
of others, how many were within the departmental policy related to
fleeing felons, and how many were found to be outside departmental
policy. Data was sought for the two most recent years available-
1970 and 1971. Although most departments supplied the data re-
quested, several were unable to do so because they did not maintain
such statistics, and compiling them would require searching the indi-
100. The theory might also be tested within a single department which modified its
policy: a change to a substantially more restrictive policy should result in a reduction
in the number of shooting incidents. Although it could not be documented because of
the lack of statistical compilations, such an effect was reported by the Compton Police
Department. After a new policy which verges on self-defense or defense of others only
(Category V) was adopted in 1968, a dramatic decrease in the number of shootings
by Compton officers took place.
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vidual personnel files of each of their officers.101 Others simply de-
clined to supply the statistical information requested without offering
any explanation.
10 2
The data, compiled separately for each year, is collected in Table
VI. Departments are listed according to the categories of restrictive-
ness of their policy, as devised in comparing their responses to the hy-
potheticals.10 3
TABLE VI
1970
Felony Total Self Fleeing Out of
Arrests Incidents Defense Felons Policy
CATEGORY I:
Burbank 685 3 1 2 0
Claremont 62 0 0 0 0
Covina 314 0 0 0 0
El Monte 1,070 4 3 1 0
Hawthorne 434 3 1 2 0
Whittier 732 0 0 0 0
TOTALS: 3,297 10 5 5 0
CATEGORY 11:
Bell 215 2 1 0 1
Bell Gardens 224 2 2 0 0
Beverly Hills 456 3 1 2 0
Gardena 525 0 0 0 0
Signal Hill 194 0 0 0 0
TOTALS: 1,614 7 4 2 1
CATEGORY IlI:
Arcadia 202 1 0 0 1
Azusa 376 0 0 0 0
Culver City 359 2 0 2 0
Glendora 236 0 0 0 0
Huntington Park 534 3 1 1 1
Los Angeles* 52,435 120 66-82 22-38 16
Maywood 101 0 0 0 0
Monrovia 334 3 0 2 1
Monterey Park 347 2 0 0 2
Redondo Beach 416 1 1 0 0
Sierra Madre 62 0 0 0 0
101. The Compton, Lynwood, Pomona and San Fernando departments do not main-
tain such statistics. If police departments are seriously interested in the continuing
reevaluation of their policy suggested by the A.B.A. Committee [THE UPBAN PoLICE
FUNCTION, supra note 5, § 1.21, it would seem the maintenance of this kind of statistical
data is certainly a prerequisite.
102. The Inglewood, Long Beach, Montebello, Santa Monica, and Torrance de-
partments, and the California Highway Patrol declined to supply this information.
Long Beach, Santa Monica and the California Highway Patrol were also among those
few departments which refused to supply copies of their written policies.
103. See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
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Vernon 224
West Covina 487
TOTALS: 56,113
CATEGORY IV:
Baldwin Park 269
El Segundo 154
Hermosa Beach 497
Palos Verdes Estates 115
San Gabriel 115
South Gate 755
South Pasadena 194
TOTALS: 2,099
CATEGORY V:
Alhambra 441
Downey 958
Glendale 954
Irwindale 32
La Verne 46
L. A. County Sheriff 23,338
Manhattan Beach 247
Pasadena 1,685
San Marino 38
TOTALS: 27,739
1971
Felony Total
Arrest Incidents
CATEGORY I:
Burbank 660 2
Claremont 59 1
Covina 323 0
El Monte 1,194 6
Hawthorne 477 7
Whittier 702 3
TOTALS: 3,415 19
CATEGORY I1:
Bell 210 1
Bell Gardens 414 1
Beverly Hills 544 3
Gardena 744 1
Signal Hill 216 0
TOTALS: 2,128 6
CATEGORY III:
Arcadia
Azusa
Culver City
Glendora
Huntington Park
Los Angeles*
Maywood
202
338
445
218
568
54,097
117
Self Fleeing Out of
Defense Felons Policy
0
0
0
0
0
101-119
2
0
1
69-85
0
0
27-43
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Monrovia 419 2 1 1 0
Monterey Park 299 1 1 0 0
Redondo Beach 483 0 0 0 0
Sierra Madre 64 1 0 0 1
Vernon 162 0 0 0 0
West Covina 545 0 0 0 0
TOTALS: 57,957 151 105-123 4-22 24
CATEGORY IV:
Baldwin Park 316 0 0 0 0
El Segundo 132 1 0 1 0
Hermosa Beach 437 0 0 0 0
Palso Verdes Estates 120 0 0 0 0
San Gabriel 109 0 0 0 0
South Gate 975 0 0 0 0
South Pasadena 152 0 0 0 0
TOTALS: 2,241 1 0 1 0
CATEGORY V:
Alhambra 423 0 0 0 0
Downey 1,245 4 4 0 0
Glendale 858 0 0 0 0
Irwindale 38 1 0 0 1
La Verne 62 0 0 0 0
L. A. County Sheriff 22,825 50 50 0 0
Manhattan Beach 297 1 1 0 0
Pasadena 1,837 3 3 0 0
San Marino 63 0 0 0 0
TOTALS: 27,648 59 58 0 1
* The statistics supplied by Los Angeles reflected categorization in the initial reports,
rather than final dispositions. Thus, out-of-policy incidents would also appear as self-
defense or fleeing felon incidents. To compensate, the totals for these categories re-
flect a range, the upper limit being the total supplied by L.A.P.D., the lower range
being the adjusted total if all out-of-policy incidents were in that category. In addi-
tion, the 1971 statistics for L.A.P.D. did not break down the incidents by self-defense
and fleeing felony categories. This was compensated for by applying the ratios re-
flected in statistics for the total number of officers involved in shootings, which were
so categorized, to the total number of incidents.
In order to reduce the data to a basis for meaningful comparison,
statistics reflecting the total number of felony arrests reported by each
department in the two years concerned were also collected. 10 4 Since
a high number of shooting incidents may simply reflect exposure of the
department's officers to a higher number of situations which might lead
to the use of deadly force, it was felt that the readily available felony
arrest statistics would be the most accurate indicator of this "risk
factor." Thus, the comparison to be made is not simply the total
number of incidents per officer, but the total number of incidents
104. State of California, Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics,
CRIME A u ARRsTs, Table II, at 21-22 (1970); State of California, Department of
Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, CRIME AND ARRESTS, Table 11, at 27-29 (1971).
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per 1,000 felony arrests. The results of such a comparison are presented
in Table VII.
TABLE VII
INCIDENTS PER 1,000 FELONY ARRESTS
Category Total Incidents Self Defense Fleeing Felons Out of Policy
1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971 1970 1971
I 3.04 5.52 1.52 3.20 1.52 1.74 0 .58
II 4.33 2.75 2.47 1.38 1.23 1.38 .62 0
flI* 2.37 2.61 1.23- 1.81- .48- .07- .37 .41
1.51 2,12 .76 .38
IV. .95 .44 .48 0 .48 .44 0 0
V 1.33 2.13 1.15 2.10 .07 0 .11 .03
* A minimum and maximum number is reflected for self defense and fleeing felon
statistics in Category III to compensate for the divergency in the statistics reported by
the Los Angeles Police Department, as noted in Table VI, supra.
The comparison indicates a strong correlation between the restric-
tiveness of policy and the number of shooting incidents reported. For
example, in both 1970 and 1971, the departments in Category I, the
least restrictive, reported more than twice as many incidents per 1,000
felony arrests than did the departments in Category V, the most re-
strictive. The difference is accounted for largely in shooting incidents
involving fleeing felons. This, of course, is where the major differ-
ences in policy occur. The results here coincide precisely with the de-
gree of restrictiveness of policy. Thus, Category I departments, which
allow their officers to shoot at any fleeing felons in accordance with
the Penal Code provisions, reported 1.52 incidents per 1,000 felony ar-
rests in 1970 and 1.74 in 1971 as within their policy related to fleeing
felons. The Category II departments, which prohibit shooting at
known juveniles, but in other respects are identical to Category I, re-
port 1.23 and 1.38 for each of the two years respectively. In Category
III, where use of deadly force against fleeing felons is restricted to
those regarded as "dangerous," the results are reflected in a range be-
tween which the exact figure would lie. The range for 1970 was .48
to .76 incidents per 1,000 felony arrests, while for 1971 the range was
.07 to .38. Thus, in both years even the top of the reported range
would fall substantially below Category II. Among Category IV de-
partments, which add to the restriction of Category IM" a flat prohibi-
tion against shooting known juveniles who are fleeing, the reported
rates were .48 and .44 for the two years. The Category V depart-
ments, which approach a policy of self-defense or defense of others
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only, report almost no shooting incidents as within policy regarding
fleeing felons: .07 for 1970, and 0 for 1971.
Almost the same correlation appears with respect to incidents classi-
fied as within policy regarding self-defense. In this category, depart-
ments with more restrictive policies report fewer incidents. This is
especially significant since, as previously noted, there were virtually
no differences in policy regarding self-defense or defense of others among
all the departments contacted. Thus, it appears that officers in those de-
partments with more restrictive policies exercise more restraint across the
board; not only do they shoot less often at fleeing felons, they also
shoot less frequently in asserted self-defense.
B. Perceptions of Policy
In order to test how individual police officers perceived their de-
partment's policy, the same five hypotheticals used to test the inter-
pretation of policy by police administrators' °5 were submitted to an en-
tire day's shift in six different departments. Each officer was asked,
with respect to each hypothetical, whether he would be justified in
shooting at the suspect under the policy of his department. He was
also asked whether, under the circumstances described, he would shoot
at the suspect.
All of the cooperating departments were promised anonymity in this
survey. The individual responses were also anonymous, although the
responding officers were asked to indicate their age, the number of
years they had been police officers, and the number of years of formal
education they had completed. Departments were selected which dif-
fered substantially in their policies, however. Department "A" has a
written policy which is interpreted by its chief to place no restrictions on
the Penal Code. Thus, Department "A" is one of those previously
classified in Category I. A total of 22 officers were tested in Depart-
ment "A". Department "B" has a written policy based upon the Chap-
man model. 106 Its interpretation of the policy would place it in Category
III of restrictiveness. Forty of Department "B's" officers responded
to the test. Department "C" does not have a written policy. The oral
policy indicated by the responses of its chief to the hypotheticals, how-
ever, would place it in Category V, the most restrictive interpretation of
policy. Forty-one officers were tested in Department "C". Depart-
ment "D" operates under a written policy which is interpreted by its
105. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
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chief as within Category V. Forty of its officers responded to the test.
Departments "E" and "F" are not actually two separate depart-
ments, but rather two different divisions of the same department.
Department "E", in which forty-eight officers were tested, is a division
operating in a middle-class suburban area, while Department "F", in
which twenty-two officers were tested, is a division operating in a work-
ing class area with a large Chicano population. Both departments,
of course, subscribe to the same policy, a written policy interpreted in
accordance with Category V restrictions.
The crime rates for the areas served by the six departments sur-
veyed differ very little. Departments "B" and "F" would be the only
departments serving areas with a crime rate above 30 arrests for major
crimes per 1,000 population. Departments "A", "C" and "D" all fall
within the middle range of 20-30 such arrests per 1,000 population,
while only Department "B" would fall below that range.
The responses for all six departments are presented in Table VIII,
with the results expressed in percentages. Although the margins vary
considerably, the majority of police officers in five of the six depart-
ments perceived their policy in basically the same way: that it would
preclude the use of deadly force in all but the third hypothetical. 107
Thus, a majority of each of these departments' officers perceived the
policy of his department to be that which we previously labeled Cate-
gory IV. Yet none of the departments tested were placed in that
category based on the interpretations of policy by the police adminis-
trator interviewed! In Departments "A" and "B", these divergencies
indicate a more restrictive view of shooting policy by the police offi-
cers than by their superiors. In the remaining four departments, how-
ever, a majority of officers understood their policy as allowing the use
of deadly force in a situation in which their administrators indicated it
would be precluded.
Most remarkable, of course, is the diversity of responses within the
same departments, indicating a good deal of confusion as to just what
departmental policy was. This was most pronounced with respect to
the third and fourth hypotheticals. The division between "yes" and
"no" responses to these hypotheticals was a very narrow one in most
107. Only Department "D" would be an exception to this pattern. A majority of
Department "D" officers also indicated their policy would allow the use of deadly force
in the fourth hypothetical, which would be consistent with Category III. The re-
sponses of Department "D's" chief to the same hypotheticals placed his department in
Category V, however.
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TABLE VIII
DEPARTMENT: ".. .. B.... c" "D' .. .. ."'
FIRST HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burgular)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 27% 17% 35% 15% 17% 10%
NO 73 83 65 85 83 90
(b) Would You Shoot?
YES 4 10 22 8 6 0
NO 96 90 78 92 94 100
SECOND HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burgular, Known Juvenile)(a) Within Policy? YES 18 2 12 2 9 5
NO 82 98 88 98 91 95
(b) Would You Shoot? "YES 0 0 2 2 2 0
NO 100 100 98 98 99 100
THIRD HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber)(a) Within Policy YES 64 78 56 83 52 59
NO 36 22 44 17 48 41
(b) Would You Shoot? YES 52 78 55 83 57 68
NO 48 22 45 17 43 32
FOURTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber, Known Juvenile)(a) Within Policy? YES 41 35 32 72 43 45
NO 59 65 68 28 57 55
(b) Would You Shoot? YES 23 35 21 51 46 45
NO 77 65 79 49 54 55
FIFTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Assault on Officer)
(a) Within Policy? YES 4 0 2 2 8 9
NO 96 100 98 98 92 21
(b) Would You Shoot? YES 0 0 0 0 4 5
NO 100 100 100 100 96 95
departments, indicating that the promulgation of policy has not been
very effective in any of the departments tested. It is interesting to note
that the closest division of opinion on the most hypotheticals, indicat-
ing the greatest confusion as to departmental policy, occurred in De-
partment "C", which was the only department whose policy was not in
writing. On the other hand, the department with the widest margin
on every hypothetical, indicating a clear perception of departmental
policy, was Department "D", in which the officers perceived far greater
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discretion to shoot than was afforded under their administrator's inter-
pretation of departmental policy. It is somewhat alarming that 83%
of Department "D's" officers view their departmental policy as allowing
the use of deadly force in the third hypothetical, and 72% in the fourth
hypothetical, differing with the interpretation of their chief on both
counts.
A comparison of Departments "E" and "F" reveals a very high de-
gree of correlation, indicating that the perceptions of policy within the
same police agency are basically the same, even though officers are
assigned to different divisions which serve vastly different populations.
When the responses of all six departments were collectively tabu-
lated, combining the responses of all 213 officers tested, the pattern
which emerged was very similar to the pattern which emerged in tab-
ulating the responses of the 50 police administrators who were inter-
viewed. As indicated in the totals in Table I, supra, the fifty police
administrators responded as follows:
First Hypothetical: 34% Yes; 66% No.
Second Hypothetical: 14% Yes; 86% No.
Third Hypothetical: 78% Yes; 22% No.
Fourth Hypothetical: 46% Yes; 54% No.
Fifth Hypothetical: 2% Yes; 98% No.
The responses of the total sample of police officers was as follows:
First Hypothetical: 20% Yes; 80% No.
Second Hypothetical: 8% Yes; 92% No.
Third Hypothetical: 65% Yes; 35% No.
Fourth Hypothetical: 45% Yes; 55% No.
Fifth Hypothetical: 4% Yes; 96% No.
Thus, to the extent that policy is merely an extension of individual
judgment or opinion, it would appear that the diversity of judgment
among police administrators is mirrored closely by the diversity among
police officers.
Of far more importance for our purposes than the acuracy of per-
ceptions of policy, however, is the actual judgment which the officers
tested indicate they would exercise in the situations presented. The
inaccuracy of the perception of policy is a serious problem, of course,
but one that can be corrected by more effective promulgation of policy.
A disparity between how an officer perceives policy and the decision
he makes presents a far more serious problem, however, indicating that
steps outside the realm of police policy are required to control his be-
havior,
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The results of such a comparison reveal that, as inaccurate as their
perceptions of policy might be, the vast majority of police officers in-
dicated a decision which coincided with their perception of depart-
ment policy. In nearly every instance, the proportion of officers who
indicated they would shoot in a given circumstance was the same or
smaller than the proportion of officers who indicated they thought that
shooting in these circumstances was within their department's policy.
The only exceptions to this pattern occurred within the same police
agency. In Department "E", although only 52% of the officers tested
indicated they felt it would be within their department's policy to shoot
in the third hypothetical situation, 57% indicated they would shoot.
Similarly, in Department "F", 68% indicated they would shoot, al-
though only 59% felt it was within departmental policy. Again, in
Department 'E", a slightly higher proportion of the officers tested in-
dicated they would shoot in the fourth hypothetical situation than had
indicated such shooting would be within policy.
If policy does in fact control police behavior, ideally the results of
this comparison would reflect that the departments with the least re-
strictive policies (Category I) would have more officers responding
that they would shoot in these hypothetical situations than departments
with more restrictive policies (Category V). Such a result did not oc-
cur. Quite to the contrary, the department with the greatest number
of officers indicating they would shoot in most of the hypothetical situ-
ations was Department "D", which we previously noted has a policy
which falls into Category V, the most restrictive, while the department
whose officers responded with the greatest restraint in most instances
was Department "A", which interprets its policy in the least restrictive
way, placing it in Category I! The vast distortions in the perceptions
of policy, however, render such a comparison meaningless. Since a
majority of the officers tested described their department policy in sub-
stantial variance with the policy as described by their administrators,
a more meaningful comparison would be to compare the proportion of
officers who would shoot or not shoot with the departmental policy as
these officers perceived it. When this is done, a high degree of correla-
tion is revealed. For example, in responding to the third hypothetical,
although a majority of officers in all six departments indicated they felt
it would be within their department's policy to shoot, the highest such
margin appeared in Department "D", followed in descending order by
"B", "A", "F", "C" and "'". Affirmative responses to the query
whether the officer would actually shoot followed much the same pat-
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tern: Department "D" led, followed by Departments "B", "F", "E',
"C" and "A", in that order.
Although perceptions of policy are most certainly a significant fac-
tor in the response of the officer tested, it may well be that other factors
are of even greater consequence. An attempt was made to correlate
the responses of the officers to three other variables in administering
these tests: each officer was also asked his age, the number of years he
had been a police officer, and the number of years of formal education
he had received. The responses are averaged and tabulated in Tables
IX, X and XI. As indicated in Table IX, there does appear to be a
strong relationship with respect to age, younger officers responding
affirmatively (that they would shoot) with greater frequency than older
officers. Similarly, Table X indicates that more experienced officers
were less likely to shoot in the hypotheticals presented than those with
less experience. Finally, Table XI indicates minor differences with
respect to the number of years of formal education, with a slight tendency
for more educated officers to shoot with more frequency than the less
educated officers. This would be consistent with the results reflected
in Tables IX and X, since the older, more experienced officers have
generally had less formal education than younger officers who were
more recently recruited.
TABLE IX
AGE
DEPARTMENT: 4.. .. 1B.. .CC" "D1 .. .. 4"7"9
FIRST HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burglar)(a) Within Policy? YES 35.3 31.4 31.3 30.7 32.8 32.5
NO 30.1 37.1 34.5 30.4 31.0 32.0(b) Would You Shoot? YES 43.0 34.0 31.0 26.3 31.6 -
NO 28.7 35.0 33.7 30.5 31.0 32.0
SECOND HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burglar, Known Juvenile)(a) Within Policy? YES 37.0 37.0 35.2 27.0 34.5 29.0
NO 27.8 36.1 32.0 30.5 30.8 32.0(b) Would You Shoot?
YES - - 32.0 26.0 26.0 -
NO 29.0 36.0 32.9 28.1 31.5 32.0
THIRD HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber)(a) Within Policy? YES 30.7 34.5 32.0 29.5 31.2 31.6
NO 27.5 39.3 34.8 33.4 31.9 33.6
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(b) Would You Shoot? YES
NO
FOURTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber, Known Juvenile)
(a) Within Policy? YES
NO
(b) Would You Shoot? YES
NO
FIFTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Assault on Officer)
(a) Within Policy? YES
NO
(b) Would You Shoot?
YES
NO
ES OF POLICE POLICY
31.5 35.3 31.5
27.0 36.2 34.4
31.5 32.0 31.5
28.0 37.5 34.0
30.0 29.1 29.1
29.4 38.7 33.0
39.0 - 36.0
29.0 36.0 33.0
29.0 36.0 33.0
29.9 30.0 31.0
32.7 32.0 32.0
29.9 32.0 30.6
33.1 30.8 33.0
27.1 31.5 31.0
33.8 35.0 30.0
26.0 28.7 31.0
30.0 32.0 32.0
- 29.5 29.0
30.0 31.0 32.0
TABLE X
YEARS AS POLICE OFFICER
DEPARTMENT: 'IN, "B .. ..C1 .. .D" 'IF, I"F,)
FIRST HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burglar)(a) Within Policy? YES 10.7 8.7 7.0 8.1 5.8 6.5
NO 4.8 11.6 6.5 7.2 5.8 6.8(b) Would You Shoot? YES 16.0 10.2 5.6 3.4 7.3 -
NO 6.3 10.6 6.7 7.2 5.7 6.8
SECOND HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burglar, Known Juvenile)
(a) Within Policy?
(b) Would You Shoot?
YES
NO
YES
NO
12.7 10.0 10.8
5.6 11.0 5.1
- - 5.0
6.4 11.0 6.5
THIRD HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber)
(a) Within Policy? YES 8.2 10.5
NO 4.5 13.4
(b) Would You Shoot? YES 8.1 11.3
NO 4.2 10.8
FOURTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber, Known Juvenile)
(a) Within Policy?
(b) Would You Shoot?
NO 5.3 12.5
YES 6.8 5.2
NO 6.2 14.0
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FIFTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Assault on Officer)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 15.0 - 11.0 4.0 5.0 5.5
NO 5.1 11.0 6.5 7.4 5.8 6.8
(b) Would You Shoot?
YES - - - - 6.5 4.0
NO 6.4 11.0 6.5 7.3 5.8 6.8
TABLE XI
YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT: "A" "B" .C" "D1" "E" 'F'
FIRST HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burglar)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 15.0 14.0 13.7 13.8 13.5 14.0
NO 14.0 13.6 13.3 13.7 13.9 14.5
(b) Would You Shoot?
YES 15.0 14.0 13.4 13.1 14.5 -
NO 14.0 13.3 13.7 13.8 13.8 14.0
SECOND HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Burglar, Known Juvenile)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 14.7 14.0 13.6 13.0 13.5 14.0
NO 14.5 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.8 14.0(b) Would You Shoot?
YES - - 14.0 13.0 15.0 -
NO 14.6 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.9 14.0
THIRD HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 14.7 13.7 13.7 13.9 14.0 14.0
NO 14.5 13.4 13.7 13.1 13.5 14.2(b) Would You Shoot?
YES 14.9 13.5 13.6 14.0 14.0 14.0
NO 14.1 14.2 13.7 12.7 13.5 14.5
FOURTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Fleeing Robber, Known Juvenile)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 13.9 14.7 13.8 13.8 13.9 14.9
NO 14.4 13.6 13.8 13.5 13.2 14.1(b) Would You Shoot?
YES 14.6 13.9 13.4 14.2 13.9 14.7
NO 14.6 13.6 13.8 13.5 13.2 14.1
FIFTH HYPOTHETICAL
(Assault on Officer)
(a) Within Policy?
YES 14.0 - 14.0 14.0 12.5 17.0
NO 14.7 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.9 14.0(b) Would You Shoot?
YES - - - - 13.5 19.0
NO 14.6 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.9 14.0
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These generalizations, for some reason, are not borne out with re-
spect to Department "A", however. This phenomenon bears further
examination, since, as previously noted, Department "A" was the de-
partment with the least restrictive policy of those tested, and yet the
officers tested perceived their policy as a very restrictive one and had
the lowest proportion of officers who indicated they would shoot in
the hypothetical situations presented. Unlike the other five depart-
ments, it was the older, more experienced officer who was more likely
to respond affirmatively that he would shoot. The explanation may
lie in the fact that Department "A" is a rather unusual department
both in the average age of its officers and the amount of formal educa-
tion they have completed. A profile of the average age, years of ex-
perience, and years of education of all of the officers tested in each of
the six departments is presented in Table XII. There is one other im-
portant respect in which Department "A" differs from the other five
departments tested, however. All of the other five departments used
the same training academy to train their new recruits, the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Academy. Department "A" did not. Conceivably,
the greater restraint of Department "A's" officers could be the product
of a different initial training experience.
TABLE XII
Average Years Average Years
of Police of Formal
Department Average Age Experience Education
"A" 29 6.4 14.6
"B" 36 11.0 13.7
"C" 33 6.5 13.6
"D" 30 7.3 13.8
"E" 31 5.8 13.9
"F' 32 6.9 14.0
C. A Consistent Hypothesis
If fewer shooting incidents occur in those departments with more re-
strictive policies, we should be able to conclude that policy is an effec-
tive device to control police behavior. But if the perceptions of policy
are generally as inaccurate as those reflected in the hypothetical testing,
it becomes a rather strained interpretation to attribute different levels
of restraint simply to differences in policy. The consistency of the re-
sponses of officers that they will shoot with their perceptions of de-
partment policy may simply mean that they perceive policy as simply a
prophylactic device by which the department will "back-up" the judg-
1973]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ment they in fact exercise. Certainly the interviews with police ad-
ministrators disclosed that many, if not most, perceive policy in pre-
cisely that way.
Nonetheless, police administrators differ in their judgment as to how
far they will "back up" their men. Policy may simply be one manifes-
tation of this attitude. Other manifestations may not be as apparent,
but are just as real to the patrolman.
The hypothesis that emerges from this analysis proceeds as follows:
. . . Police in different police agencies exercise differing degrees of
restraint in the use of deadly force;
. . . The degree of restraint exercised by police coincides with the
degree of restrictiveness of the declared department policy;
. . . This relationship between restraint and declared policy exists
even though individual police officers are inaccurate in their
perceptions of department policy;
• . . Police policy is simply a manifestation of basic, underlying at-
titudes in a police agency. These attitudes are perceived, even
though the policy is not.
Needless to say, this hypothesis calls for a good deal of further research
into the dynamics of police bureaucracy. To what extent can the "at-
titudes" which pervade an institution be measured? What is the
source of these attitudes? To what extent can these attitudes be
changed? Hopefully, in depth studies of police departments as social
institutions can supply some answers.'10 The importance of these answers
transcends questions regarding the use of deadly force, since internal
policy is currently being proposed as a means of controlling the exer-
cise of police discretion in a wide range of settings, including the de-
cision to arrest, and the use of certain investigative techniques. 100
VIII. CONCLUSION -
If policy is simply a manifestation of institutional attitudes which
pervade a police department, then simply changing policy internally
may not significantly affect police behavior. This is not the same as
saying policy is not an effective control device, however, where the
policy is imposed externally. To this extent, "policy" is analogous to
"law," which most certainly is a significant restraining influence on
108. E.g., J. WILSON, VARITiFs OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968).
109. Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Per-
formance, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1123 (1967).
[Vol. 6
VARIETIES OF POLICE POLICY
police behavior. "Policy" implies an administrative flexibility whic
"law" cannot afford, however. Thus, a solution to the problem o i
versity disclosed by this study may be found in externalizing the process
of policy formulation, promulgation and enforcement.
The diversity of police policy in one metropolitan area disclosed by
this survey should be of little surprise in light of the process of internal
policy formulation revealed. As long as police policy is in large part
simply a reflection of the personal philosophy of the police chief who
administers an individual police department, it is inescapable that fifty
police departments administered by fifty different chiefs will have sub-
stantial differences in policy. Were the matter simply an academic
question of philosophy, there would be little cause for concern. But
it appears that the differences reflected in policy can be clearly meas-
ured in human lives. Whether such an option should be left open to
each individual police chief is a question of the greatest urgency.
Diversity of policy also has serious consequences in terms of the ef-
ficiency with which police agencies can operate. Training of new re-
cruits as to the kind of judgment they should exercise in the use of
their weapons cannot be done on a systematic basis in the confines of
present training programs, used by different departments with differing
policies regarding the use of deadly force. Joint operations pursuant
to mutual assistance pacts may also find officers working together to
apprehend a felon, even though those officers are governed by widely
divergent policies as to when deadly force should be used to capture
that felon. Confusion, however, is not simply the product of diversity
among police departments. Even within the same department, this
survey revealed wide disparity in the interpretation of policy. This
disparity, it is suggested, is the inevitable product of vagueness and
ambiguity in the policies promulgated by many departments. While
vagueness may be desired by those police administrators who regard
policy as a flexible standard which gives them maximum maneuvera-
bility to "back up" their officers, it cannot be tolerated if policy is to
function as a means of controlling discretion.
On one point, the police administrators interviewed were almost
unanimous in agreement; there is little justification for different cities
in the same county, or even in the same state, to have different policies
regarding the use of deadly force by police officers. A fleeing burglar
is neither more nor less dangerous because he happens to be in Azusa
rather than Downey. Whether a fleeing juvenile felony suspect should
be shot or allowed to escape should not depend upon whether he is in
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El Monte or El Segundo. When asked how uniformity could best be
accomplished, however, the unanimity quickly dissipated.
One suggestion frequently made was that the Penal Code be
amended to clearly delineate and restrict the situations in which an
officer could use deadly force. While its breadth and ambiguity sug-
gest that the code is drastically in need of attention,110 it may be un-
110. A number of proposals to change or supplant the fleeing felon provisions of
Penal Code § 196 are currently under discussion. The Joint Legislative Committee for
Revision of the Penal Code has proposed, as part of a new Criminal Code for Cal-
ifornia, the following provision:
§ 645. Use of force in making and securing arrests
645. (a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned to assist him,
is justified in conduct, including the use of force other than deadly force, when he
has reasonable cause to believe that such conduct is necessary to prevent the defeat
of an arrest or custodial restraint.
(b) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned to assist him,
is justified in the use of deadly force when he has reasonable cause to believe that
deadly force is necessary to prevent the defeat of an arrest or custodial restraint for
the crime of or an attempt to commit:
(1) Murder, manslaughter, or aggravated criminal injury; or
(2) Aggravated kidnaping or kidnaping; or
(3) Rape, deviant sexual conduct, or sexual abuse of a child; or
(4) Robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated arson, or
arson
(c) When the use of deadly force subjects a person other than the person
intended to be arrested or restrained to an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily injury, the justification defined in subdivision (b) of this section is not
available in a prosecution for killing such other person or inflicting bodily injury
upon him.
(d) A person other than a peace officer who makes or assists another
person in making a citizen's arrest is justified in conduct, including the use of
force other than deadly force, when he has reasonable cause to believe that such
conduct is necessary to prevent the defeat of an arrest or custodial restraint.
(e) As used in this section, "custodial restraint" means restraint by. a
peace officer or other person following an arrest with or without a warrant prior
to the official booking of the person arrested. State of California Joint Legislative
Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, The Criminal Code (Staff Draft,
1971).
An amendment to § 196 of the Penal Code is currently before the legislature as
Senate Bill No. 1480, introduced by Senator Arlen Gregorio on May 4, 1972. It would
provide:
§ 196. Homicide is justifiable when
(a) Necessarily committed by public officers in retaking felons who have es-
caped, or
(b) Committed in arresting persons charged with or suspected of having com-
mitted a felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting arrest, and when the
officer reasonably believes that:
(1) The crime for which the arrest is to be made involved conduct in-
eluding the use or threatened use of deadly force; or
(2) There is substantial risk that the person to be apprehended will
cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed; or
(3) There is substantial imminent risk that the person to be apprehended
will cause death or serious bodily harm to the officer or another person.
The Gregorio proposal is quite similar to the Chapman Model Policy already widely
adopted in Los Angeles County (see text accompanying notes 70-71 supra), and both
bear a striking resemblance to the recommendation of the Model Penal Code:
Section 3.07. Use of Force in Law Enforcement.
(1) Use of force justifiable to effect an arrest. Subject to the provisions of this
1973] VARIETIES OF POLICE POLICY
desirable to attempt to enact statutory guidelines which purport to be
so specific that policy limitations become unnecessary, assuming this is
even within the realm of human possibility. For one thing, the code
provisions are, of course, penal in nature. They leave only one alterna-
tive for their violation-a criminal prosecution of the offending officer.
The criminal sanction is fraught with so many pitfalls, in terms of its
delays and uncertainties, that it would certainly be folly to place chief
reliance upon it as a means of controlling police behavior. Moreover,
it would measure the seriousness of a transgression only by its conse-
quences. It may be that an officer who shoots and misses in a situa-
tion in which the use of deadly force is clearly unwarranted should be
disciplined more severely than one whose aim is better but whose judg-
ment does not fall as far short of the statutory standard.
Voluntary efforts to achieve uniformity are commendable, but ap-
Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward the person of another
is justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest.
(2) Limitations on use of force.
(a) The use of force is not justifiable under this Section unless:
(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that
it is otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the per-
son to be arrested; and
(ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is
valid, or believed by the actor to be valid.
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace
officer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substan-
tial risk of injury to innocent persons; and
(iv) the officer believes that there is a substantial risk that the per-
son to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehen-
sion is delayed, on either or both of the following grounds:
(1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct evi-
dencing a lawless readiness to take human life or cause serious bodily
harm; or
(2) the person to be arrested is armed with a firearm which he em-
ploys or threatens to employ to escape arrest.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
Also worthy of consideration is the formulation offered as part of the Federal
Criminal Code by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws:
§ 607. Limits on the Use of Force: Excessive Force; Deadly Force.
(1) Excessive Force. A person is not justified in using more force than is
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances.
(2) Deadly Force. Deadly force is justified in the following instances:
(d) when used by a public servant authorized to effect arrests or prevent
escapes, if such force is necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape
from custody of a person who has committed or attempted to commit a felony
involving violence, or is attempting to escape by the use of a deadly weapon,
or has otherwise indicated that he is likely to endanger human life or to inflict
serious bodily injury unless apprehended without delay . ...
Hearings on Reform of Federal Criminal Laivs Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
202-03 (1971).
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parently doomed from the outset. The diversity of interpretation
among even those departments with identical written policies indicates
that agreement on a written policy provides only the most superficial
uniformity.
A model for achieving greater uniformity on a state-wide basis is al-
ready in existence. Since its establishment in 1959, the California
Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training' (P.O.S.T.)
has accomplished a great deal in achieving uniform standards in the
training of police officers. Through its control of allocations from the
Peace Officers Training Fund, which finances most of the training pro-
grams operated by police agencies throughout the state, the commis-
sion has imposed a wide variety of minimum standards, including spe-
cifications as to how much time must be allocated to training in the use
of firearms."' P.O.S.T. has carefully tread the thin line, however,
between setting training standards and dictating policy. Most of the
police administrators interviewed were vigorously opposed to P.O.S.T.
invading the domain of policy formulation. If a state-wide police
policy board is to be established, it would be advisable to create a body
separate from P.O.S.T., lest the accomplishments of that agency in
achieving professionalization among police agencies be jeopardized by
embroiling it in the controversial process of policy formulation and en-
forcement.
Policy formulation and enforcement on a statewide basis could best
be accomplished through a board somewhat along the lines first sug-
gested by Professor Joseph Goldstein, in his classic analysis of police
discretion not to invoke the criminal process:
"[L]egislatures should establish Policy Appraisal and Review Boards
not only to facilitate coordination of municipal police policies with
those of other key criminal law administrators, but also to assist com-
missions drafting new codes in reappraising basic objectives of the
criminal law and in identifying laws which have become obsolete. To
ensure that board appraisals and recommendations facilitate the inte-
gration of police policies with overall state policies and to ensure the
cooperation of local authorities, board membership might include the
state's attorney general, the chief justice of the supreme court, the
chairman of the department of correction, the chairman of the board
of parole and the chief of parole supervision, the chairman of the de-
partment of probation, the chairmen of the judiciary committees of the
legislature, the chief of the state police, the local chief of police, the lo-
111. CAL. PFN. CODE § 13500 et seq. (West 1972).
112. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 832 (West 1972).
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cal prosecutor, and the chief judge of each of the local trial courts. In
order regularly and systematically to cull and retrieve information, the
board should be assisted by a full-time director who has a staff of in-
vestigators well-trained in social science research techniques. It should
be given power to subpoena persons and records and to assign investi-
gators to observe all phases of police activity including routine patrols,
bookings, raids, and contacts with both the courts and the prosecutor's
office.1 13
While Goldstein envisioned a Policy Appraisal and Review Board which
advised local departments as to their policies, a more active role is
necessitated by this proposal. A board would be empowered to es-
tablish a state-wide policy governing the use of force by police officers,
and to enforce that policy through investigations, hearings, and a wide
range of administrative sanctions.
This device would allow implementation of many of the reforms in
policy formulation currently being demanded which are beyond the
means of many smaller police departments. A legal staff would be
available to advise the board, and through public hearings a wide
range of community participation in the process of policy formulation
could be elicited. The board could be so constituted as to ensure in-
put from police administrators and rank and file, as well as other
components of the criminal justice system.
The consistent interpretation of a single state-wide policy by a single
agency would go far to dispel much of the confusion which now sur-
rounds many policies of individual departments. Policy pronounce-
ments and administrative rulings would be publicly promulgated, and
every police officer would be on notice as to what standards were being
followed. Judicial review of policy could also be greatly facilitated. 1
4
Enforcement by a single body would also produce much-needed re-
form. Disciplinary decisions would be effectively insulated from the
public clamor of the local community in which an incident occurred.
Discipline would also be independent of the subjective elements which
frequently intrude when a police administrator is dealing with his own
subordinates.
By placing policy formulation and enforcement in the hands of a
single state-wide administrative agency, we would finally recognize
that the function or objective of police policy is no different than that of
113. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visi-
bility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 588-89 (1960).
114. See generally McGowan, supra note 44.
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any other administrative policy-to achieve uniformity by controlling the
exercise of individual discretion. To be sure, many police administra-
tors would be violently opposed to this proposal as the first step
towards elimination of the local police department as we know it.
Certainly, the small local police department has important advantages
that must be preserved. The maintenance of those advantages, how-
ever, does not require sacrificing meaningful control through ra-
tional policy formulation and consistent administrative enforcement.
Achieving this through a state-wide administrative agency may be an
important step in maintaining public confidence in the police and re-
storing judicial confidence in means other than evidentiary exclusion-
ary rules as viable alternatives for the control of police behavior.
APPENDIX
Department
Alhambra
Arcadia
Azusa
Baldwin Park
Bell
Bell Gardens
Beverly Hills
Burbank
California Highway
Patrol
Claremont
Compton
Covina
Culver City
Downey
El Monte
El Segundo
Gardena
Glendale
Glendora
Hawthorne
Hermosa Beach
Person Interviewed Date
Chief Donal Meehan
Chief Robert E. Seares
Chief Carl Elkins
Chief Dale Adams
Capt. Joe Thomas
Chief Ferice Childers
Chief B. L. Cork
Capt. E. J. Vandergrift
Inspector G. B. Craig
Chief Charles Lines
Capt. J. W. Start
Chief Charles Huchel
Capt. A. E. Lang
Chief Loren D. Morgan
Dep. Chief Maurice L. Matthews
Chief James H. Johnson
Chief Roy E. Tracey
Sgt. LeRoy Newman
Lt. Fred Dahm
Chief Colman E. Young
Chief William H. Berlin, Jr.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
of Interview
5/31/72
4/21/72
4/7/72
4/7/72
6/20/72
6/20/72
6/26/72
7/11/72
7/11/72
4/21/72
6/21/72
4/8/72
6/28/72
6/20/72
4/7/72
6/29/72
6/27/72
7/11/72
4/7/72
6/17/72
6/28/72
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(22) Huntington Park
(23) Inglewood
(24) Irwindale
(25) La Verne
(26) Long Beach
(27) Los Angeles Police
Department
(28) Los Angeles Sheriff's
Office
Lynwood
Manhattan Beach
Maywood
Monrovia
Montebello
Monterey Park
Palos Verdes
Estates
Pasadena
Pomona
Redondo Beach
San Fernando
San Gabriel
San Marino
Santa Monica
Sierra Madre
Signal Hill
South Gate
South Pasadena
Torrance
Vernon
West Covina
Whittier
Capt. L. Russell
Lt. R. J. Goodyear
Chief Ernest V. Aguirre
Lt. Junior Hendricks
Capt. Richard L. Wolf
Ass't. Chief Daryl Gates
Ass't. Sheriff Howard Earle
Lt. Jim Burns
Chief Charles W. Crumley
Lt. Thedore R. Heidke
Lt. Carroll 0. Brown
Lt. D. L. Cooper
Capt. Ray Warner
Capt. J. E. Dollarhide
Special Agent Ward Blackburn
Ass't. Chief F. P. Wallick
Capt. H. Peterson
Sgt. Chuck Stein
Capt. Harry C. Stone
Capt. T. F. Girvan
Ass't Chief G. Constable
Chief Thomas C. Kendra
Lt. Gaylord R. Wert, Jr.
Chief Robert W. Taylor
Lt. John F. Gillette
Capt. Robert E. Hammond
Chief R. H. Bockhacker
Chief Allen Sill, Sr.
Chief James F. Bale
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
6/27/72
6/27/72
4/21/72
4/21/72
6/29/72
7/13/72
7/12/72
6/21/72
6/28/72
6/20/72
4/21/72
5/31/72
5/31/72
6/29/72,
5/26/72
4/7/72
6/30/72
7/11/72
5/31/72
5/31/72
6/28/72
5/31/72
6/29/72
6/21/72
5/26/72
6/27/72
6/20/72
4/7/72
6/2/72
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